The response model of moral disgust

Plakias, Alexandra

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1455-3

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…14 Something similar often gets called "moral disgust" (Chapman and Anderson 2013, Kelly 2013, Plakias 2018. We avoid that label here and in our above discussion of anger (i.e see Russell and Giner-Sorolla 2011) to signal that not all internalized norms need be moral norms, and disgust (or anger, or any other emotion) can be activated by a norm transgression whether or not that norm counts as moral Kelly 2018, Stich 2018).…”

Section: Angermentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for the Emotional Psychology of Group Membership

Davis

Kelly

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides many local insights but is largely fragmented, lacking an overarching framework that might provide a unified overview and guide conceptual integration. As a result, it remains unclear where different local perspectives conflict, how they may reinforce one another, and where they leave gaps in our knowledge of the phenomena. Our aim is to start constructing a framework to help remedy this situation. We first identify a few key ideas for creating a theoretical roadmap for this complex territory, namely the principles of etiological functionalism and the dual inheritance theory of human evolution. We show how a "molecular" approach to emotions fits into this picture, and use it to illuminate emotions that shape intergroup relations. Finally, we weave the pieces together into the beginnings of a systematic taxonomy of the emotions involved in social interactions, both hostile and friendly. While it is but a start, we have developed the argument in a way that illustrates how the foundational principles of our proposed framework can be extended to accommodate further cases.

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Section: Angermentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for the Emotional Psychology of Group Membership

Davis

Kelly

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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“…Often one only feels compassion for a group of people, such as immigrants, if one antecedently judges them to be unfairly disadvantaged or deserving of sympathy (Betancourt 1990). And we feel repugnance toward those acts we antecedently deem immoral (Plakias 2018;May 2018b). In a set of electroencephalography (EEG) studies, for example, carefully time-locked recordings of participants' brain waves suggest that they first judge an action to be moral or immoral and then, milliseconds later, judge the act to be disgusting or not (Yang et al 2013;2014).…”

Section: Entanglement and Rationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Rationalism on the Brain

May¹

2021

Preprint

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I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.

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“…Alexandra Plakias (2018) distinguishes what she calls the evidential model of moral disgust from what she calls the response model. On the evidential model, adopted, for example, by Leon Kass (1997), the primary function of moral disgust is first-personal.…”

Section: Pl a K I A S A N D T H E R E Sponse Mode Lmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking a social perspective on moral disgust

Gert

2021

Metaphilosophy

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Research on moral disgust suffers from a methodological bias. The bulk of such investigation focuses almost exclusively on the operation of moral disgust within the psychology of a single individual, or as involving an interaction between two people. This leads to certain questions being salient, while other phenomena, which emerge only at the level of an entire community or society, are largely hidden from view. The present paper explains and defends a perspective that emphasizes the role of moral disgust within a community. It also illustrates the usefulness of this perspective by applying it to three quite distinct accounts of moral disgust: Alexandra Plakias's response model of moral disgust, David Pizarro's idea that moral disgust is part of a behavioral immune system, and Jesse Prinz's selfconsciously simple form of moral sentimentalism.

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The response model of moral disgust

Cited by 12 publications

References 29 publications

A Framework for the Emotional Psychology of Group Membership

A Framework for the Emotional Psychology of Group Membership

Moral Rationalism on the Brain

Taking a social perspective on moral disgust

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