An attitude is the evaluation or affect associated with a social object. A theory of attitudes should specify (1) how attitude objects are represented, and (2) what kind of representation constitutes an attitude. To the first question, social psychologists long ago anticipated answers that are now attractive to cognitive psychologists. On the second, social psychologists are in need of help that can come from recent cognitive psychological work on unconscious processes .An attitude is the evaluation or affect associated with a social object. From its beginnings in the 1920s, the study of attitudes has directed theoretical attention to social objects. Social objects are such things as people (for example, friends or political candidates), categories of people (such as racial and ethnic groups) , or abstract concepts (such as abortion rights or God) .Social psychologists have long interpreted attitude objects as abstract mental representations. This cognitive conception of motivation was notable for its deviation from the reductionist physical stimulus approach to motivation in experimental psychology before 1960, and it anticipated by many years the development of motivational concepts such as goals and plans in cognitive psychology.A problematic aspect of the nature of representations associated with attitudes concerns the nature of representations that constitute attitudes themselves. Social psychology presently has two well-formulated conceptions of the structure of attitudes. One is that attitudes have a tripartite structure, consisting of affective, cognitive, and conative components (e.g., Breckler, 1984;Ostrom, 1968). The tripartite conception originates in an ancient partition of mental life into affect, cognition, and conation. (That ancient trichotomy appears to have been effectively undermined by modem cognitive psychology, but that is a story for another occasion.) A second widely held view of attitude structure is that attitudes consist of proposition-like representations of the attitude object's attributes (e. g. , Fishbein, 1967b).I will conclude that these two answers, both of which have found wide acceptance in social psychology, are not very useful. Furthermore, it appears that there is now a good chance to base a new and useful understanding of the structure of attitudes on recent work by cognitive psychologists.