The representational theory of mind

Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars

“…First, Clark seems to suggest that naturalizing intentionality is a matter of identifying the neural mechanisms implicated in hierarchical prediction error minimization, which he takes to be part and parcel of the first-order research programme of predictive processing itself. This stands in stark contrast to the division of labour philosophers are accustomed to, in which cognitive scientists posit a computational architecture and philosophers explain what determines the contents of its representations (Fodor 1987 ; Von Eckardt 2012 ). Second, Clark seems to ignore all those characteristics of intentionality that have made the problem of content so difficult, reducing it instead to our ability to gain a “rich and varied grip upon the world.” What about determinacy, shared contents, and the possibility of mis representation, for example (Fodor 1987 ; Hutto and Satne 2015 )?…”

“…The concept of internal representation is central to the contemporary cognitive sciences and has been since the downfall of behaviourism and the “cognitive revolution.” A foundational assumption across these sciences is that intelligent behaviour and adaptive response mandates the construction and manipulation of content-bearing internal states or stand - ins for elements of the distal environment (Bermudez 2010 ; Von Eckardt 2012 ).…”

“…This scepticism has given rise to what Von Eckardt ( 2012 ) calls “the foundational problem of cognitive science,” the “content determination problem”: is it possible to identify the natural properties, relations and processes that determine the intentional properties of internal representations without circularity? A widely-held assumption is that unless this problem can be answered—unless content can be reduced to naturalistically kosher non-content—representational explanation in cognitive science must at best be an instrumental gloss on fundamentally non-representational processes (Fodor 1987 ; Sterelny 1991 ).…”

“…Second, many theorists have argued that representation implies a triadic relation between the vehicle , its target , and—crucially—the cognitive system that uses or interprets the former to direct its behaviour appropriately towards the latter (O’Brien 2015; Ramsey 2007; Von Eckardt 2012). One rationale for this functional claim is that it is implied by the very concept of representation 4.…”

“…2There is an enormous literature tackling this question (cf. Haugeland 1991; Ramsey 2007; Von Eckardt 2012). …”