The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions

Abstract

Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action’s content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent‐Based Moral Judgment

“…Finally, our stimuli included only harm violations and not other kinds of moral wrongs, including violations of norms about purity, loyalty, or other concerns (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Recent work suggests that the influence of intentions on moral judgment is strongest for harm violations and less strong for other kinds of violations, including purity violations (Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Chakroff et al., 2016; Chakroff, Russell, Piazza, & Young, 2017; Chakroff & Young, 2015; Dungan, Chakroff, & Young, 2017; Giner‐Sorolla & Chapman, 2017). From this perspective, harm violations are an ideal set of stimuli with which to test our hypotheses.…”

Asking ‘why?’ enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations

“…Work in moral psychology and social neuroscience has started to provide such evidence in the context of purity norms vs harm norms. In particular, mental states appear to matter less in moral judgments of purity violations relative to harm violations (Barrett et al ., 2016; Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Dungan, Chakroff, & Young, 2017; Young & Saxe, 2011). The current results further demonstrate the robustness of this effect: while responses to harm violations change flexibly with task instructions, the same is not true for responses to purity violations.…”

“…Another not mutually exclusive possibility is that judgments of purity violators rely on simpler heuristics that preclude the deployment of more complex mental state reasoning. Compared to harm violations, purity violations lead to stronger person-based, dispositional attributions that do not incorporate information about mitigating circumstances (Chakroff & Young, 2015), perhaps including the violator’s innocent mental state (Barrett et al ., 2016; Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Dungan, Chakroff, & Young, 2017; Young & Saxe, 2011). Relatedly, perceptions of a person’s bad moral character may be more tied to purity violations than harm violations (Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017; Russell & Piazza, 2015).…”

“…murder) relative to purity violations (e.g. incest; Chakroff et al , 2013; Dungan et al , 2017; Young & Saxe, 2011). Strikingly, this intent effect holds even across eight small-scale societies tested in recent cross-cultural work (Barrett et al , 2016).…”

“…the perpetrator was forced to commit the violation; Chakroff & Young, 2015; Piazza et al ., 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a,b). Additionally, as discussed above, whether an action was committed intentionally or accidentally matters relatively less for moral judgments of purity violations compared to harm violations (Barrett et al ., 2016; Chakroff et al ., 2013; Dungan et al ., 2017; Young & Saxe, 2011).…”