The relevance of Kant's objection to Anselm's ontological argument

Heathwood, Chris

doi:10.1017/s0034412510000314

Rel. Stud.

2010

DOI: 10.1017/s0034412510000314

|View full text |Cite

The relevance of Kant's objection to Anselm's ontological argument

Chris Heathwood

Abstract: The most famous objection to the ontological argument is given in Kant's dictum that existence is not a real predicate. But it is not obvious how this slogan is supposed to relate to the ontological argument. Some, most notably Alvin Plantinga, have even judged Kant's dictum to be totally irrelevant to Anselm's version of the ontological argument. In this paper I argue, against Plantinga and others, that Kant's claim is indeed relevant to Anselm's argument, in the straightforward sense that if the claim is tru… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2021

2022

Publication Types

Select...

Article3

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent3

Authors

Journals

Cited by 3 publications

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?

Czerkawski¹

2021

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.

show abstract

Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?

Czerkawski¹

2021

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Relevance of Kant’s Objection to the Ontological Arguments and Avicenna’s Exploration of Existence as an Alternative Grounding

Tabur

2022

EuJAP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the present paper, the three most prominent formulations of the ontological argument will be analysed, namely the classical argument which renders existence a perfection, Norman Malcom’s modal version of the argument which labels not existence but necessary existence a perfection, and Alvin Plantinga’s modal version of the argument which appeals to the possible worlds semantics to prove the necessity of God’s existence. According to Kant’s objection, the ontological argument takes existence to be a predicate that adds up a further perfection to the concept of God and thereby entails either a reference problem between the actual object and its concept or infers God’s actual existence in a tautological way. Despite its impact, Kant’s objection to the argument has been criticised for his ambiguous employment of the notion of existence as well as for being irrelevant to the ontological argument and to the modal ontological argument by Plantinga. In the present study, I aim first to show that Kant’s objection is not only relevant to the classical version of the argument but also to the modal formulations of it as opposed to Plantinga’s claim. In doing so, I argue that it is not Kant’s use of the notion of existence that is ambiguous, but it is the classical and modal versions of the ontological argument which gain their apparent strength from their ambiguous employment of the notion of existence. Second purpose of the paper is to give an alternative analysis of the notion of existence based on Avicenna’s metaphysics and thereby to point towards an alternative ground for a possible reformulation of the ontological argument, which could avoid Kant’s objection.

show abstract

Schelling’s Criticism of Ontological Argument and Interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of the Ideal of Reason

Patkul

2021

Kantian Sbornik

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To reconstruct a critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God in Schelling’s philosophy I examine his interpretation of the ontological argument by Anselm of Canterbury and Descartes as well as Schelling’s assessment of the critique of the Kantian ontological proof of the existence of God. I propose a reconstruction of Schelling’s account of undoubted being which cannot be deduced from the concept of the totality of all that is possible and therefore must come before any thought. He interprets reason as having an ecstatic nature which posits precedent undoubted being. This enables Schelling to formulate his own version of the thesis on the unity of being and thought, whereby being comes first and thought is only second. Against this background I analyse Schelling’s interpretation of the Kantian account of the ideal of reason. Schelling, on the one hand, agrees with Kant that being is not a real predicate, hence real existence cannot be deduced from essence in the sense of “what.” But, on the other hand, in contrast to Kant, he believes that real existence of the individual absolute must be assumed, which would be the subject for all possible predicates and whose being is ecstatically posited by reason as being external to itself. I raise the question of the relevance of Schelling’s thought for modern ontology, above all in overcoming ontotheology. Proceeding from the works of J. F. Courtine and L. Tengelyi I single out two aspects of Schelling’s doctrine that are relevant to my subject: (1) the priority of existence over essence in God’s being and (2) the fundamental irreducibility of God to a necessarily existent being, i.e. God’s freedom. It is evident that, in his interpretation of Kant, Schelling somewhat simplifies his train of thought and leaves it unclear how Kant links the concepts of necessary being and the supremely perfect being. It is also evident that Schelling’s concepts of “contingency,” “contingent necessity,” “the whole experience” need further study.

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

The relevance of Kant's objection to Anselm's ontological argument

Cited by 3 publications

References 13 publications

Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?

Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?

The Relevance of Kant’s Objection to the Ontological Arguments and Avicenna’s Exploration of Existence as an Alternative Grounding

Schelling’s Criticism of Ontological Argument and Interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of the Ideal of Reason

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About