Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in
AbstractWe present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a controlled laboratory experiment we test our model. In the experiment, subjects conduct computerized tasks that require substantial effort resulting in endowments from which contributions can be made to a linear public good. After observing others' contributions subjects express social approval. Our main hypothesis is that subjects have a preference for social approval so that the expression of social approval will increase contributions, even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available to subjects and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. Our main finding is that the expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase in contributions is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions.JEL Codes: C72, C91, D71, D83. Keywords: Experimental Economics, Linear Public Good Games, Non-monetary Incentives, Social Approval. * Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany. Email: matthias.greiff@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de, www.matthiasgreiff.net. We thank Max Albert, Nina Bobkova, Sebastian Finckler, Andreas Hildenbrand, Susanne Neckermann, Karim Sadrieh, Carolin Schürg, Stefan Traub and Hongyan Yang, the participants of the economics research seminar at the University Giessen, the public economics research seminar (Schumpeter School, Wuppertal), economics brown bag seminar at the University of Bremen and the participants of the ESA world meeting 2011 in Chicago for helpful comments, discussions and encouragement. All remaining errors are our own. This work was supported by a grant from the "Verein zur Förderung des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Universität Bremen und dessen Zusammenarbeit mit der Bremer Wirtschaft" (wiwib. e.V.).