Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being adjusted to all available information or to adjusted but biased prices.
I INTRODUCTIONPrices allocate resources and disseminate information. Competitive markets are usually taken to fulfil these roles efficiently. 1 However, the competitive framework only fits few product markets, and it is an open question how information dissemination interferes with price determination in imperfectly competitive product markets. 2 This problem is non-trivial as prices are also affected by the bid for market share. The aim of this paper is to study how information dissemination interferes with price determination in an imperfectly competitive product market.How would knowledge about market conditions affect price determination when the firm possessing this information realizes that any change in the price will be considered carefully by its competitors, who want to infer whether the change in the price is a bid for market share, or a response to new information on market conditions? As the firm possessing private information is aware that competing firms make inferences from its price, a possibility arises that the firm might use its information strategically.
245Ã University of Aarhus ÃÃ University of Warwick 1 A classical reference is Hayek (1945). For an introduction to the literature on the informational efficiency of capital markets see e.g. Radner (1981). 2 In a model of an asset market with asymmetrically informed speculators and imperfect competition, Kyle (1989) shows that in the rational expectations equilibrium prices reveal less information than in a competitive equilibrium and no longer become fully informative. As the model is a one shot game where all actors choose their strategy simultaneously, any information contained in the prices only reaches the uniformed after they choose their strategy.The most simple product market structure allowing us to capture the strategic implications of private information for price determination is a Stackelberg leader-follower model. It captures the key feature that other firms react to the price set by others within a given period. If the leader has private information the dual role of price determination in an imperfectly competitive market comes to the forefront as it affects market shares and disseminates information. We consider a two-period version of the model where it is assumed that information on market conditions in the first period is common knowledge, while the demand is subject to an unanticipated change which becomes known to the leader before setting the period two price.Imperfect competition turns out to affect information transmission by prices in a way which is qualitatively different from competitive markets. Specifically, prices are either not adjusted to available informati...