The relative facts interpretation and Everett's note added in proof

Conroy, Christina

doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2012.03.001

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…13 The many-worlds interpretations are popular among Everettians. However, Conroy (2012) has provided textual evidence that it is possible to understand Everett as endorsing a single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics. 14 For a survey of EQM, see Vaidman (2018); for the original paper, see Everett III (1957); for an updated book-length development of the theory, see Wallace (2012).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Realism about the wave function

Chen

2019

Philosophy Compass

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A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non‐relativistic quantum mechanics.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The many‐worlds interpretations are popular among Everettians. However, Conroy () has provided textual evidence that it is possible to understand Everett as endorsing a single‐world interpretation of quantum mechanics.…”

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confidence: 99%

Realism about the wave function

Chen

2019

Philosophy Compass

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“…7 We leave many interesting questions aside: does fragmentalism really deliver (i)-(iii) above? What is the main difference between this understanding of the quantum state and some relative state readings, such as the one in Conroy (2012)? How is this variant of quantum fragmentalism related to the so-called primitive ontology approach-see e.g.…”

Section: Fragmentalism and Its Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?

Iaquinto

Calosi

2020

Philos Stud

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Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state-which he calls conservative realism-according to which: (i) the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, (ii) the quantum (superposition) state is grounded in its terms, and (iii) the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the system in question. We will argue that fragmentalism, at least along the lines proposed by Simon, does not offer a new, satisfactory realistic account of the quantum state. This raises the question about whether there are some other viable forms of quantum fragmentalism.

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“…There are controversies that vonNeumann (1955) actually endorsed CCCH (seeBueno 2019) and thatEverett (1957) endorsed MWI (seeConroy 2012), even though it is a fairly common association. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, we can safely attribute these theses toWigner (1961) andDeWitt (1970;1971), respectively.…”

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confidence: 99%

On Physics, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics

Arenhart

Arroyo

2021

Metaphilosophy

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Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (QM) works perfectly well for all practical purposes. Once one admits, however, that a successful scientific theory is supposed not only to make predictions but also to tell us a story about the world in which we live, a philosophical problem emerges: in the specific case of QM, it is not possible to associate with the theory a unique scientific image of the world; there are several images. The fact that the theory may be compatible with distinct ontologies, and that those ontologies may themselves be associated with a plurality of metaphysical approaches, gives rise to the problem of metaphysical underdetermination. This paper concludes that the available metametaphysical criteria fail to deliver objectivity in theory choice, and it puts forward its own criterion based on a tension between two methods of metaphysical inquiry: one that is closely related to science and another that is not.

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The relative facts interpretation and Everett's note added in proof

Cited by 9 publications

References 28 publications

Realism about the wave function

Realism about the wave function

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?

On Physics, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics

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