2014
DOI: 10.5539/ijbm.v9n12p49
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The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm’s Performance: An Empirical Evidence from Palestine

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between the ownership structure and performance of 31 firms listed on the Palestine Stock Exchange (PS) during the period of 2008-2012. The results reveal that ownership concentration to be significantly negative related with performance of firms (Tobin's Q and ROA), while the insider ownership (executive management and directors of board) found to have significant positive relation with firm's performance (Tobin's Q and ROA). The findings supported the prediction of alignm… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 57 publications
(99 reference statements)
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“…For example, Warokka and Reddy et al argue that large shareholders are better able to monitor and control managers, thereby improving firm performance. However, other studies find a negative impact for ownership concentration (Shahab-u-Din and Javid, 2011;Ongore, 2011;Fauzi and Locke, 2012;Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2014;Dwaikat and Queiri, 2014;Wang and Shailer, 2015;Buallay et al, 2017). For example, Ongore suggests that excessive large shareholder control can stifle managers" creativity, while Fauzi and Locke argue that increasing block holder ownership can interfere with managers" decisions, leading to greater agency problems.…”
Section: Ownership Concentrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Warokka and Reddy et al argue that large shareholders are better able to monitor and control managers, thereby improving firm performance. However, other studies find a negative impact for ownership concentration (Shahab-u-Din and Javid, 2011;Ongore, 2011;Fauzi and Locke, 2012;Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2014;Dwaikat and Queiri, 2014;Wang and Shailer, 2015;Buallay et al, 2017). For example, Ongore suggests that excessive large shareholder control can stifle managers" creativity, while Fauzi and Locke argue that increasing block holder ownership can interfere with managers" decisions, leading to greater agency problems.…”
Section: Ownership Concentrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The proxy for firm value is Tobin's Q (dependent variable) which captures market expectations of future earnings as against the various accounting measures of value which reflect a tangible balance sheet effect (Das, 2017;Dwaikat and Queiri, 2014;Alfaraih et al, 2012;Lin and Chang, 2010;Ragothaman and Gollakota, 2009;Shin Ping and Tsung Hsien, 2009;Klein et al, 2005;Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001;McConnell and Servaes, 1990). The following regression function is employed to examine the above stated hypothesis: Tobin's Q 5 f (foreign ownership, age, debt to equity ratio, current ratio, sales, beta, business risk, opportunities, asset structure) Tobin's Q ratio is a commonly accepted measure of efficiency and future opportunities of the firm (Chen et al, 2008).…”
Section: Variables Studiedmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The independent variable is controlling shareholders (CS), who are mostly few in number but holding the majority of shares, which gives them a dominant position over the others (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000;Dallas, 2004). Controlling shareholders are proxied with the level of the biggest share ownership either held by an individual or institution above 5% of all shares circulating (Earle et al, 2004;Dwaikat & Queiri, 2014;Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2015;Nguyen et al, 2015).…”
Section: Independent Variablementioning
confidence: 99%