The relation between subjects and their conscious experiences

Taylor, Henry

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01379-w

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 26 publications

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“…On the second view, phenomenal properties are instantiated by experiences, understood as particulars which are not themselves subjects but which are suitably related to subjects (this is what Nida-Rümelin terms the experience property framework ; for criticism of this framework see ibid. ; Taylor 2020 ). In what follows I shall assume the framework of experiential properties, but later in this section the choice between these two frameworks will be relevant and I shall discuss it briefly.…”

Section: Inner Awareness As a Feature-encountering Mode Of Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness

O’Conaill

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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We are each aware of our own experiences as they occur, but in this inner awareness our experiences do not seem to be presented to us as objects in the way that they typically are when we reflect on them. A number of philosophers, principally in the phenomenological tradition, have characterised this in terms of inner awareness being a non-objectifying mode of awareness. This claim has faced persistent objections that the notion of non-objectifying awareness is obscure or merely negatively characterised. In this paper I shall outline a positive conception of a non-objectifying mode of awareness, feature-encountering awareness. I shall apply this conception to our awareness of our experiences, characterising it as an awareness of instantiations of phenomenal properties in a temporal dimension. Inner awareness thus characterised clearly differs from standard modes of objectifying awareness.

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Section: Inner Awareness As a Feature-encountering Mode Of Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness

O’Conaill

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness

Gottlieb

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience

O'Conaill

2024

The Philosophical Quarterly

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The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be identical with bundles of experiences. I shall argue that while the having objection is intuitively plausible, its dialectical force is limited since it does not work without substantial further metaphysical assumptions.

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The relation between subjects and their conscious experiences

Cited by 3 publications

References 26 publications

Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness

Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness

Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness

The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience

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