The relation between language and mental state reasoning

Abstract

This chapter discusses how children’s conceptual representations of the mind make contact with language. It focuses on two domains: the understanding of the conditions that lead to knowledge, and the ability to attribute knowledge to oneself and others. Specifically, it asks whether language provides the representational resources necessary for representing mental states and whether cross-linguistic differences in encoding of mental states influence sensitivity to the features that distinguish the conditions that allow people to gain knowledge. Empirical findings in these domains strongly suggest that language scaffolds the development of these cognitive abilities without altering the underlying conceptual representations of mental states.

How we explore, interpret, and solve complex problems: A cross-national study of problem-solving processes

“…Beyond the lower prevalence of computer-based tests, spatial biases of the Arabic language which runs from right to left and not from left to right like European languagescan influence human behavior and can cause biases at both low-level perceptuo-motor skills and high-level conceptual representations (Rom an et al, 2015). Language has the potential to influence cognitive processes as it may direct attention to conceptual representations and distinctions that are encoded in a given language over others (Gleitman and Papafragou, 2012;Landau et al, 2010); it is a type of tool that influences human representational resources (Ünal and Papafragou, 2018). Thus, language-related factors can cause invariance in measuring rroblem solving.…”

Cultural evolutionary pragmatics: Investigating the codevelopment and coevolution of language and social cognition.

“…CULTURAL EVOLUTIONARY PRAGMATICS nonverbal tasks, dismissing comparable effects observed with verbal tasks (see, e.g., Ünal & Papafragou, 2018Ünal & Papafragou, , 2020. However, investigating how language and CSC may have coevolved and codevelop requires focusing both on universals and cross-linguistic differences, and investigating, precisely, how language and social cognition are jointly used in communication.…”

“…Of the many formulations of the linguistic relativity hypothesis that have been proposed over the years (see Enfield, 2015), thinking for speaking has been the least controversial one (Wolff & Holmes, 2011). However, defendants of nativist accounts of conceptual structure have often downplayed the importance of thinking for speaking on the grounds that “any language-driven effects on cognition should be malleable and ephemeral in nature” (Ünal & Papafragou, 2020, 125) because “these language-driven effects are temporary and task-dependent (…) without modifying the underlying conceptual representations” (Ünal & Papafragou, 2018, 165).…”

“…The scope of cultural evolutionary pragmatics—as conceived here, falls outside this long-standing debate for two reasons: First, empirical research on linguistic relativity has focused on cross-linguistic differences that may affect thought, without regard for the effect of linguistic universals on thought. Second, nativists have called for the effects of language on thought to be measured through nonverbal tasks, dismissing comparable effects observed with verbal tasks (see, e.g., Ünal & Papafragou, 2018, 2020). However, investigating how language and CSC may have coevolved and codevelop requires focusing both on universals and cross-linguistic differences, and investigating, precisely, how language and social cognition are jointly used in communication.…”

Relations Between Language and Cognition: Evidentiality and Sources of Knowledge

“…These delays in false‐belief understanding persist in adults who were exposed to sign language later in life but have not yet acquired mental state vocabulary (Pyers & Senghas, ), suggesting a relation between language and reasoning about mental states. Even though the precise contribution of language on the development of epistemic reasoning is debated, it seems unlikely that the syntactic features of the terms that express mental states in language provide the resources necessary for representing mental states; instead, language is a tool that can facilitate the processing and tracking of mental states in both children and adults (for fuller discussion, see Ünal & Papafragou, ).…”