The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism

Howard-Snyder, Frances

doi:10.1017/s0953820800005306

Cited by 70 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…The other is the inability to perform the required act (even if we know that it would bring justice about). Views diverge as to whether or not the first of these inabilities (call it 'epistemic inability') really shows that a principle of justice violates 'ought implies can' (see Howard-Snyder 1997;Carlson 1999). Whether or not we include epistemic inability in our definition will have great implications for which principles are ruled out by the ability constraint.…”

Section: Three Feasibility Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice

Chahboun

2016

Res Publica

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The feasibility constraint on the concept of justice roughly states that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for something to qualify as a conception of justice is that it is possible to achieve and maintain given the conditions of the human world. In this paper, I propose three alternative interpretations of this constraint that could be derived from different understandings of the Kantian formula 'ought implies can': the ability constraint, the motivational constraint and the institutional constraint. I argue that the three constraints constitute a sequence in the sense that accepting the motivational constraint presupposes that we accept the ability constraint, and to accept the institutional constraint presupposes that we accept both previous constraints. Adding the possibility of rejecting all three constraints, we get four distinct metatheoretical positions that theorists could take vis-àvis the feasibility constraint on justice. Keywords Feasibility Á Fact-sensitivity Á Ought implies can Á Compliance Á Realism Á Justice In recent years, scholars have shown a growing interest in the role feasibility constraints play or ought to play in political theory (see e.g.

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Section: Three Feasibility Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice

Chahboun

2016

Res Publica

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“…For additional perspectives on the epistemic critique, see Norcross (1990), Frazier (1994, Howard-Snyder (1997), andMiller (2002). Hayek (1991) can be thought of as offering a version of the epistemic critique as well.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism

Cowen¹

2006

Utilitas

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Should radical uncertainty about the distant future dissuade us from judging options by referring to their consequences? I argue no. Some short-run benefits are sufficiently high that we should pursue them, even if our long-run estimates possess a very high variance. I discuss the relationship between the epistemic argument and 'fuzzy' rankings and also 'arguments from infinity'. Furthermore, extant versions of the epistemic argument require the assumption that we have no idea about the major consequences of our acts. Even a slight idea about some major consequences will render the epistemic argument less plausible. In most applications of the epistemic argument, long-run uncertainty is not the relevant confounding variable; on close examination the epistemic argument tends to trade on other principles altogether.

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“…It might of course be that saving the antique is indeed supererogatory. However, in principle, it is possible to advance a new example where the source action is not supererogatory while retaining the same argumentative structure as that in Kolodny's original example.17 For further a discussion concerning 'ought implies can' see(Austin 1956;Carlson 1999;Dahl 1974;Howard-Snyder 1997;King 2014;Stocker 1971;Vranas 2007).18 This might depend on one's view in Jackson-style cases, such as the doctor who can give one of three possible drugs to a sick patient. One of the drugs will partially cure the patient.…”

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confidence: 99%

Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

Werkmäster

2018

Philosophia

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This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient. Even though these objections have been discussed previously, the counterarguments have so far relied on rejecting premises that the proponents of these objections are unlikely to concede. In this paper, I show how we may answer the objections in a way more likely to convince proponents of the objections. The result is an argument for a key aspect when it comes to understanding how reasons and ends-means normativity function. Normative transmission from ends to necessary means is not only interesting at the structural level, it is also possible to argue that it has implications for areas as diverse as philosophy of rationality, political philosophy and applied ethics.

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The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism

Cited by 70 publications

References 1 publication

Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice

Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice

The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism

Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

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