The Reform of the Swedish Pension System – Initial Results

Settergren, Ole

doi:10.3917/rfas.034.0369

Cited by 4 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…This process was continued by the Social Democrats when they returned to power in 1994 (Lundberg 2003). The new Swedish pension system enacted in stages between 1992 and 2001 (Settergren 2003) is a major change in concept from the old one. The universal pension tier is being phased out, and a new earnings-related pension, based on NDC principles, will almost certainly be less generous than its predecessor over time as automatic longevity adjustments are phased in.…”

Section: Specific Regime Transitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change

Weaver¹

2010

J. Pub. Pol.

224

155

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The literature on path dependence has emphasized positive feedback effects that make it difficult to shift from a policy regime once it is in place. This article argues that policy regimes may also have strong negative feedback effects that undermine the political, fiscal or social sustainability of an existing policy regime. The prospects for a shift in policy regime depend largely on the balance between positive and negative feedback effects; the availability of incremental reform options that can be used to patch the status quo; and the availability of politically and fiscally attractive regime transition options. The paper argues that differential survival rates of different public pension regimes in western industrial countries can be understood by the interaction of these three factors.

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Section: Specific Regime Transitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change

Weaver¹

2010

J. Pub. Pol.

224

155

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“…Although the Swedish pension system was fi nancially better placed than many others in the early 1990s, a consensus had emerged that reform was essential. Due to the predicted increase in the elderly population, forecasts showed that the once strongly growing buff er fund 8 would be exhausted by 2015-2020 (Settergren 2003). Th ese concerns triggered a search for a new pension model, and the reform momentum was characterised by pragmatic more than ideological considerations.…”

Section: Intersentiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It strengthened the logic of an autonomous system that would run on autopilot, adjusting automatically as external parameters change. Th e purpose was to have an additional safety valve to prevent the system from running into lasting imbalances if demographic or economic trends did not turn out as predicted (see Settergren 2001Settergren , 2003.…”

Section: Intersentiamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Sustainability of the NDC Pension Model: The Cases of Sweden and Italy

Schøyen¹,

Stamati²

2013

European Journal of Social Security

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Since the early 1990s we have seen pension reforms in a large number of advanced welfare states, and the most impressive reforms have happened in countries with Bismarckian pension systems. Some of these countries have adopted a particularly innovative pension model which is based on pay-as-you-go financing and benefits that are a function of lifetime contributions. The approach is known as the notional defined contribution (NDC) model. This article examines what has happened to the public pension systems in Sweden and Italy after they were among the first to adopt the NDC model in the mid-1990s. By focusing on the degree of political consensus and conflict in the national pension policy debate since the NDC formula was introduced, the article offers an empirical assessment of the degree of political sustainability enjoyed by these landmark reforms. The paper shows that reform processes do not end with legislation. For reforms to have a lasting impact, whether they are left to work as intended also matters. The ‘post-adoption’ policy trajectory depends on a number of factors related to policy design, economic context and political ownership.

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“…The final pension reform package was sold as having the potential to yield a pension equivalent to that under the prior system-at least for those who worked steadily for forty years, if there were no further increases in life expectancy over that prevailing in 1994, and making optimistic but plausible estimates of overall economic growth (2 percent annually) and returns on the individual account tier included in the final package (Sweden, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2002: 23;Settergren, 2003). However, projected life expectancy increases after 1994 made the idea that pension replacement rates would remain stable obsolete by the time implementing legislation for the new NDC pension was adopted.…”

Section: Swedenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Security on Auto-Pilot: International Experience with Automatic Stabilizer Mechanisms

Bosworth

Weaver

2011

SSRN Journal

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The Reform of the Swedish Pension System – Initial Results

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change

Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change

The Political Sustainability of the NDC Pension Model: The Cases of Sweden and Italy

Social Security on Auto-Pilot: International Experience with Automatic Stabilizer Mechanisms

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