The Reasonable in Justice as Fairness

Abstract

The publication of Political Liberalismhas allowed John Rawls to bring to the fore issues that remained in the background of A Theory of Justice. His explicit attention to the concept of ‘the reasonable’ is a welcome development. In a more recent publication, he affirms the importance of this concept, ‘while [granting] that the idea of the reasonable needs a more thorough examination than Political Liberalism offers.’ In this paper, I will present a critical exposition of the senses of the reasonable on which justice as fairness relies. Rawls employs the term in four main contexts. I will outline these various senses and argue that in each case, a controversy in the secondary literature can be resolved by close attention to the concept of the reasonable. In three of these contexts, Rawls relies on what I will call a ‘strong’ sense of the reasonable, while in one he sometimes seems to rely on a ‘weak’ sense. I argue that justice as fairness is best served by relying on a strong sense throughout.

Finding Reasons for being Reasonable: Interrogating Rawls

“…Is reasonable as a moral power of citizens really distinct from the rational? As discussed above (more recently), there have been a number of articles in support of the idea that it is reasonableness that reigns supreme in Rawls' conception and its supporting propositions (DePaul 1998;Nielson 1998;Mandle 1999;Young 2001;Rasmussen 2004). This essay argues (in Sections 3 and 4) that the position of the reasonable as a moral power of citizens in Rawls' political liberalism is that of a derivative of the rational.…”

Respecting Human Dignity: Contract Versus Capabilities

“…So, “reasonable” applies to persons and to comprehensive doctrines 19 . The exact relationship between reasonable persons and those who hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines is also a matter of controversy (see Mandle 1999). This much is clear, however: reasonable persons tend to hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines.…”

“… 19 It also applies to conceptions of justice and limits on the procedure of construction. See Mandle 1999. Rawls's account of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is at 1993, 59. …”

On Robust Discursive Equality

“…Macedo and Larmore are perhaps most upfront about the grounding role of an idea of respect for political liberalism's view of public justification. 13 On reasonableness in political liberalism, see Larmore (2015), p. 72ff; Mandle (1999); Enoch (2015), pp. 120-122; Besch (2004); Besch (2012).…”