The Reality of Social Groups

Sheehy, Paul

doi:10.4324/9781315553627

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…C's morally relevant joint action is irreducible to a subset of or the aggregation of the individual members' actions, and if (ii.) either the moral practice of attributing (collective) responsibility to C, or the interpersonal practice of entertaining so-called reactive attitudes (à la Strawson 1968), such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, blame, etc., towards C, are justified, then C should be treated as a (characteristically personal) subject bearing moral agency, accountability and responsibility (Finnis 1989;Tollefsen 2003;Graham 2004; see also with slightly different emphasis, Manning 1984;Sheehy 2006;Huebner 2014; cf. Hess 2013).…”

Section: Mapping the Contemporary Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%

Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They?

Szanto¹

2016

Analytic and Continental Philosophy

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Section: Mapping the Contemporary Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%

Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They?

Szanto¹

2016

Analytic and Continental Philosophy

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“…‘France conducted airstrikes’ could be paraphrased as ‘Jean and Pierre conducted airstrikes’, and the reference to the state could be eliminated. The problem with this translation is that it cannot account for counterfactuals about what would have happened if different members of the state had acted or if the membership of the state had been different (Sheehy, 2006: 17–23). If different French pilots, Lucien and Jacques, had conducted the airstrikes, then ‘France conducted airstrikes’ would remain true but ‘Jean and Pierre conducted airstrikes’ would be false.…”

Section: The Metaphorical Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states

Fleming

2016

European Journal of International Relations

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Action-sentences about states, such as 'North Korea conducted a nuclear test', are ubiquitous in discourse about international relations. Although there has been a great deal of debate in IR about whether states are agents or actors, the question of how to interpret action-sentences about states has been treated as secondary or epiphenomenal. This article focuses on our practices of speaking and writing about the state rather than the ontology of the state. It uses Hobbes' theory of attributed action to develop a typology of action-sentences and to analyze action-sentences about states. These sentences are not shorthand for action-sentences about individuals, as proponents of the metaphorical interpretation suggest. Nor do they describe the actions of singular agents, as proponents of the literal interpretation suggest. The central argument is that action-sentences about states are 'attributive', much like sentences about principals who act vicariously through agents: they identify the 'owners' of actions-the entities that are responsible for them-rather than the agents that perform the actions. Our practice of ascribing actions to states is not merely figurative, but nor does it presuppose that states are corporate agents. Sean Fleming. "Artificial Persons and Attributed Actions: How to Interpret Action-Sentences about States." Forthcoming in the European Journal of International Relations. 6 his semantic claim that 'it is never right to speak of states acting' and that the common tendency to do so is 'a misleading habit' (2005: 355n, emphasis in original; 2014: 39, 71-74). Lomas argues that action-sentences about states are pernicious metaphors that can and ought to be eliminated from our discourse: 'Scientists induce chemical changes; bus drivers drive buses; governments govern us. States do nothing. We have no need of a verb for them' (2014: 39). Marks (2011: 16) agrees with Lomas that ascribing actions to states is a metaphor, but he sees it as a benign one: 'the metaphor [of state agency] is useful

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“…Members must also know that other members have done the same, and all members must recognize that a group exists and think of themselves as part of it (Gilbert, 1989). Sheehy (2006) presents the intentionality thesis as the view that "individuals can constitute a social group only when each believes or understands himself to be linked in some salient way with the others or when each conceives of himself as a member of the group" (p. 58). Although Sheehy (2006) admits that this is a commonly accepted view, he criticizes Gilbert for assuming intentionalism without providing an adequate argument for it (p. 60).…”

Section: Joint Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sheehy (2006) admits that the "mob is perhaps the most ephemeral of social groups," but argues that the mob has causal power by having some effect on its members" actions and on the world without meeting the intentionality condition prescribed by Gilbert (P. 77). Sheehy"s mob example does provide the effects that Gilbert and others want (myself included) without the intentionalist baggage; however, the mob seems to be so unstable that it would come into and out of existence too quickly to be considered a social group.…”

Section: Joint Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The fact that we can do this, and that it is intelligible to others, gives some credence to the view that groups are objects. Sheehy (2006) argues this point when he states: "reference to groups is ineliminable or indispensable from our description and explanations of the social world" (p. 73) Many of our views on the social world would not make sense without this view of groups. However, the fact that we talk about and view groups in this way could be mistaken.…”

Section: The Causal Powers Of Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Groups as Objects: How Groups Can be Considered Objects within the Eliminativist Account

Mayer¹

2015

International Journal of Social Science Studies

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The power of groups over their members has been well documented in psychological, sociological, and political literature. There is, however, not as much written about the metaphysical status of these groups or the implications of this status. Trenton Merricks establishes a criterion for determining whether something counts as an object, and he concludes that only persons meet this criterion. While at first this designation seems trivial, it does have implications for how we treat and view those things we view as objects and for how we treat and view non-objects. In this article, I argue that some groups meet the criterion proposed by Merricks for distinguishing objects from non-objects by establishing characteristics these groups must meet to be considered objects. If I am right, these groups then deserve the status and rights that come with being a person.

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The Reality of Social Groups

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They?

Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They?

Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states

Social Groups as Objects: How Groups Can be Considered Objects within the Eliminativist Account

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