Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, those who accept the asymmetry claim have a significant burden of proof. * I would like to thank Chris Cowie, Guy Fletcher, and Bob Stecker for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to audiences at the University of Leeds in 2014, the Humane Philosophy and the Arts Conference in Oxford in 2014, and the Realism and Antirealism in Metaethics and Aesthetics Conference in Cambridge in 2014, as well as to two anonymous referees and various associate editors at Ethics.