The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo*

Abstract

The Rambouillet process sought to re‐establish autonomous governance andhuman rights for Kosovo, under the protection of the international community. However, the Kosovo authorities had committed themselves to outright independence while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consistently rejected any international interest in the affairs of Kosovo, which it considered an entirely domestic matter. To reconcile these irreconcilable views, an initial attempt was made to establish self‐governance for Kosovo for an interim period, without touching upon the issue of the status of that territory. As the Rambouillet conference progressed, the Contact Group moved significantly towards the FRY/Serb demand of expressly confirming its continued sovereignty and territorial integrity over Kosovo. While this and other concessions did not help to engage the FRY in the negotiating process, itjeopardized the acceptance of the agreement by Kosovo. The negotiations werebacked by the threat of the use of force, which could only be innovatively justified by reference to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, inasmuch as there existed no formal Security Council mandate. However, the credibility of that threat was initially undermined by splits within the Contact Group during the actual negotiations, which also extended to implementation of the agreementupon acceptance by NATO. Moreover, the negotiations were hampered by thefact that one of the three principal international negotiators openly sided withone of the parties and essentially represented it. Encouraged by these divisions, Belgrade manoeuvred itself into a position of direct confrontation with NATO, which could now genuinely argue that the grave humanitarian emergency in Kosovo could only be addressed through acceptance of the Rambouilletaccord by Yugoslavia, even if sustained military attacks were required to achieve that end.

Representation and agency in diplomacy: How Kosovo came to agree to the Rambouillet accords

“…24 For Weller's own account of the Kosovo conference, see Weller (1999bWeller ( , 2009. 25 Interview with Bujar Bukoshi, Pristina, 28 September, 2015;Kola (2003, p. 349).…”

Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo

“…The Kosovo delegation at Rambouillet included five representatives of the KLA, and "the delegation voted to appoint 29-year-old Hashim Thaci from the KLA, rather than President Rugova, to head the tripartite presidency of the Kosovo team." 88 And even though the composition of the Kosovo delegation caused a lot of controversy (with the Serbs refusing to attend the conference along with the terrorists), this recognition of the KLA signified its perception in the West as a legitimate party in the conflict, rather than a terrorist organization.…”

To Share or to Divide? Negotiating the Future of Kosovo

“…The KLA reaffirmed its commitment to terminating the use of armed force and a NATO-led peacekeeping force entered Kosovo from 12 June. 16 Imposed Power-Sharing Ideally, power-sharing is the result of agreement after negotiations among the parties to the conflict. However, the present form of power-sharing in Kosovo as an international protectorate was imposed by UN provisions, without a consensus among the formerly warring parties.…”