Search citation statements
Paper Sections
Citation Types
Year Published
Publication Types
Relationship
Authors
Journals
This book articulates and defends the robust mapping account—the most systematic, rigorous, and comprehensive account of computational implementation to date. Drawing in part from recent results in physical information theory, it argues that mapping accounts of implementation can be made adequate by incorporating appropriate physical constraints. According to the robust mapping account, the key constraint on mappings from physical to computational states—the key for establishing that a computation is physically implemented—is physical-computational equivalence: evolving physical states bear neither more nor less information about the evolving computation than do the computational states they map onto. When this highly nontrivial constraint is satisfied, among others that are spelled out as part of the account, a physical system can be said to implement a computation in a robust sense, which means that the system bears the physical signature of that computation. The book applies this robust mapping account to important questions in physical foundations of computation and cognitive science, including the alleged indeterminacy of computation, pancomputationalism, and the computational theory of mind. It shows that physical computation is determinate, nontrivial versions of pancomputationalism fail, and cognition involves computation only insofar as neurocognitive systems bear the physical signature of specific computations. It also argues that both consciousness and physics outstrip computation.
This book articulates and defends the robust mapping account—the most systematic, rigorous, and comprehensive account of computational implementation to date. Drawing in part from recent results in physical information theory, it argues that mapping accounts of implementation can be made adequate by incorporating appropriate physical constraints. According to the robust mapping account, the key constraint on mappings from physical to computational states—the key for establishing that a computation is physically implemented—is physical-computational equivalence: evolving physical states bear neither more nor less information about the evolving computation than do the computational states they map onto. When this highly nontrivial constraint is satisfied, among others that are spelled out as part of the account, a physical system can be said to implement a computation in a robust sense, which means that the system bears the physical signature of that computation. The book applies this robust mapping account to important questions in physical foundations of computation and cognitive science, including the alleged indeterminacy of computation, pancomputationalism, and the computational theory of mind. It shows that physical computation is determinate, nontrivial versions of pancomputationalism fail, and cognition involves computation only insofar as neurocognitive systems bear the physical signature of specific computations. It also argues that both consciousness and physics outstrip computation.
No abstract
This chapter is a primer on physical computation. It distinguishes between abstract and concrete computation. It introduces the notion of simulation of one physical system by another and the more specific notion of computational simulation of a physical system by a computing system. It introduces the problem of distinguishing between physical processes that count as computations and physical processes that don’t, as well as other desiderata of an adequate account of physical computation. It introduces pancomputationalism, which is the most liberal way of drawing a boundary. It introduces different accounts of concrete computation—mapping accounts, semantic accounts, and mechanistic accounts—and explains that the robust mapping account developed in subsequent chapters can improve upon and be integrated with the three families of accounts. Finally, it introduces the physical Church-Turing thesis, according to which any physically computable function is computable by Turing machines.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
customersupport@researchsolutions.com
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.