The Puzzle of Temporal Experience

Kelly, Sean D.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610608.007

Cited by 65 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The synchrony or ''simultaneity problem'' proper arises when we ask the question ''to what extent can we claim to have experienced events as simultaneous?'' At the crux of the problem are events that are nonsimultaneous but which we see as simultaneous and it might be considered an acceptable claim that, irrespective of the actual simultaneity of two events, in perception events can be considered simultaneous if that is how they seem to the observer (Kelly, 2005). However, the following logic modifies this consideration.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

A Moment to Reflect upon Perceptual Synchrony

Elliott

Shi

Kelly³

2006

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

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How does neuronal activity bring about the interpretation of visual space in terms of objects or complex perceptual events? If they group, simple visual features can bring about the integration of spikes from neurons responding to different features to within a few milliseconds. Considered as a potential solution to the “binding problem,” it is suggested that neuronal synchronization is the glue for binding together different features of the same object. This idea receives some support from correlated- and periodic-stimulus motion paradigms, both of which suggest that the segregation of a figure from ground is a direct result of the temporal correlation of visual signals. One could say that perception of a highly correlated visual structure permits space to be bound in time. However, on closer analysis, the concept of perceptual synchrony is insufficient to explain the conditions under which events will be seen as simultaneous. Instead, the grouping effects ascribed to perceptual synchrony are better explained in terms of the intervals of time over which stimulus events integrate and seem to occur simultaneously. This point is supported by the equivalence of some of these measures with well-established estimates of the perceptual moment. However, it is time in extension and not the instantaneous that may best describe how seemingly simultaneous features group. This means that studies of perceptual synchrony are insufficient to address the binding problem.

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confidence: 96%

A Moment to Reflect upon Perceptual Synchrony

Elliott

Shi

Kelly³

2006

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

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“…On this type of view, experiencing is itself conceived of as something that unfolds over time, and the reason why we can have experiences of succession and other temporal experiences must lie with the fact that it does so, just as the extensionalist has it. 12 In other words, 11 Note that-as Kelly (2005) also remarks-the relevant sense in which the do is no longer around here has to be distinguished from another sense in which, say, a supernova in a far away galaxy may no longer be around when I observe it. The relational view can allow that, in the latter kind of case, I do now stand in the relevant relation of awareness to the supernova, even though the supernova itself is in the past.…”

Section: Two Views Of (Temporal) Experiencementioning

confidence: 98%

'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'

Hoerl¹

2013

Mind

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“…Sean Kelly explicating states that the puzzle of temporal experience is not a result of the "hard problem of consciousness" (Kelly 2005). I disagree.…”

Section: The Puzzle Of Temporal Passage and The "Hard Problem"mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, how could one directly experience D at A? If it is in the future, it is not being directly experienced (Kelly 2005). Kelly shows that the Species Present Theory raises more questions than it answers.…”

Section: Reconciling "Static Snapshots" and "Dynamic Present" Wimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In RT, we don't directly perceive moments in the past and future, like in SPT, but instead maintain an immediate memory and an immediate expectation of moments (Ismael 2011). However, Kelly rightfully argues that Husserl merely names it, but fails to explain it, and explanation is what we are trying to achieve (Kelly 2005). Furthermore, RT may name and describe the illusion of the dynamic present that we are concerned with, but it fails to make any sense of the knowledge and experience asymmetries.…”

Section: Reconciling "Static Snapshots" and "Dynamic Present" Wimentioning

confidence: 99%

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