2015
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02103004
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The Pursuit of International Recognition After Kosovo

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Cited by 21 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…As mentioned above, the issue of contested statehood and its implications (and consequencesintended or unintended) for EU engagement has remained underresearched. Some scholars have focused on so-called "engagement without recognition" (Cooley and Mitchell 2010;Caspersen 2015;Ker-Lindsay 2015;Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018). EU studies scholars have focused on the impact of integration and association Diez et al 2008), how domestic actors of contested states understand the EU (Vahl andEmerson 2004, Popescu 2007) and how their representatives interact with it (Bouris and Fernandez Molina 2018), diplomatic issues (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012), and the EU's state-building efforts but without taking into account the specific parameter of contested statehood (Bieber 2011;Börzel 2011;Bouris 2014).…”
Section: Enter Contested Statehoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As mentioned above, the issue of contested statehood and its implications (and consequencesintended or unintended) for EU engagement has remained underresearched. Some scholars have focused on so-called "engagement without recognition" (Cooley and Mitchell 2010;Caspersen 2015;Ker-Lindsay 2015;Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018). EU studies scholars have focused on the impact of integration and association Diez et al 2008), how domestic actors of contested states understand the EU (Vahl andEmerson 2004, Popescu 2007) and how their representatives interact with it (Bouris and Fernandez Molina 2018), diplomatic issues (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012), and the EU's state-building efforts but without taking into account the specific parameter of contested statehood (Bieber 2011;Börzel 2011;Bouris 2014).…”
Section: Enter Contested Statehoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, the authorities of the de facto entities legislated against initiatives in this direction. For instance, the president of Abkhazia announced the intention to expel those international organizations that offer neutral Georgian travel documents to Abkhazians (Caspersen 2015, 402). Additionally, between 2015 and 2016, both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali passed Laws on Foreign Citizens detrimental of the civic and property rights of dual citizens 22 .…”
Section: Territorial Integrity and Pro-western Orientation: The (Voicmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Paquin's (2010, p. 8) study of U.S. foreign policy toward secessionist entities, for example, defines support quite narrowly as diplomatic recognition because "there is a major difference between granting diplomatic recognition and demonstrating solidarity through material and political means." Caspersen (2015) also notes that such a strategy is constrained externally by the binary division in the international system between sovereign states and everything else and internally by the importance that seeking recognition plays in securing the loyalty of the de facto state's own population.…”
Section: Engagement Without Recognitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The work highlighted in the progress section on how international norms have helped shaped democratization in de facto states is one area that has received significant attention. Another area that has received scholarly attention has been the whole question of whether the Western-led recognition of Kosovo or the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has weakened the strong international normative consensus against secession in favor of territorial integrity (Caspersen, 2015;Crawford, 2007;Fabry, 2012;Ker-Lindsay, 2013). There is a strong consensus among these scholars that post-Cold War state practice is not more favorable to secessionist aspirants than Cold War practice.…”
Section: Prospectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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