The Puppet Masters

Willebois, Emile van der Does de; Halter, Emily M.; Harrison, Robert A.; Park, Ji Won; Sharman, J. C.

doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-8894-5

Cited by 62 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…17. In the case of Pinochet the Financial institution itself was instructed, by the general, to create a network of shall & bearer share companies to manage its assets, see: Supplemental Staff Report on US Accounts Used by Augusto Pinochet (March 16, 2005 S.Prt. 109-25) 34; Komisar, (2015); Van der Does de Willebois, et al , 2011, p. 63…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the introduction of the first set of requirements on PEPs, international studies and best practices recognised that “corporate vehicles provide one of the most effective ways to separate the origin of the illegal funds from the fact that the PEP controls it” (FATF, 2011; p. 19). In 2010 and 2011, the World Bank (WB) published two detailed analyses revealing how corrupt officials use legal entities to hide stolen assets (Van der Does de Willebois et al , 2011; Greenbeg et al , 2010). In the same period, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) also focussed on mechanisms for the laundering of the proceeds of corruption (FATF, 2010a, 2010b; p. 40, 2011; p. 17, 2012,).…”

Section: The Politically Exposed Person Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Politically exposed entities: how to tailor PEP requirements to PEP owned legal entities

Canestri

2019

JMLC

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Purpose This paper aims to address the money laundering risk posed by politically exposed person’s (PEP’s) controlled legal entities. International standards and national legislation require enhanced due diligence of political office holders but no specific requirements exist on entities controlled by PEPs. While regulators expect the stringent AML risk mitigation regarding this type of entities, financial institutions have no guidelines to follow. This gap produces inconsistent due diligence measures applied to entities with significant PEPs’ connection. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses comparative analysis to identify discrepancies between legal requirements and their interpretation. Moreover, an empirical approach results in a standardised solution to address these discrepancies. Findings The paper defines the concept of politically exposed entities and the applicable due diligence framework. Anticipating legislative measures, it proposes to introduce this concept via best practices of financial institutions and private banking initiatives such as the Wolfsberg Group. Research limitations/implications The research addresses the topic from a legal point of view. However, the implementation of proposed ideas depends on decisions which are political by nature and are not within the scope of this paper. Practical implications The paper aims at stimulating a debate in both the private and public sector to form a consistent approach to AML due diligence of legal entities associated to PEPs. Originality/value This paper responds to an identified need to study how legal entities connected to PEPs should be defined and monitored.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Politically Exposed Person Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politically exposed entities: how to tailor PEP requirements to PEP owned legal entities

Canestri

2019

JMLC

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“…International asset recovery proceedings target foreign leaders, officials and their associates who increase their personal wealth through acts of corruption or mismanagement and transfer the plundered assets away from the jurisdiction of origin. International asset recovery may be hindered by numerous obstacles (Van der Does de Willebois et al , 2011), such as the sophistication of the methods used to conceal the illicit assets, the length and the complexity of judicial proceedings and cross-border investigations, the lack of expertise and willingness of the competent authorities in the jurisdictions involved, etc. Switzerland’s commitment to fight impunity and not to serve as a depository for the assets of kleptocrats has become a priority of the Swiss strategy against economic criminality (Conseil fédéral Suisse, 2012a; FATF, 2005) as well as an integral part of Swiss foreign policy (Conseil fédéral suisse, 2012b, p. 15).…”

Section: The Swiss Experience With Asset Recoverymentioning

confidence: 99%

Asset recovery: a Swiss leap forward?

Pavlidis

2017

JMLC

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Purpose International asset recovery proceedings may be hindered by several obstacles, especially in the case of “failed states” or of states that experience a regime change. In this context, Switzerland, a country with extensive experience in asset recovery, attempted two legislative leaps forward, the first in 2011 and the second in 2016. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the legislative innovations in Switzerland, with special reference to their strengths, weakness and compatibility with human rights standards. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws on legal scholarship, jurisprudence, reports and other open source data, to analyze two important legislative innovations in Switzerland [Law on the Restitution of Assets of Criminal Origin of 2010 (LRAI) and law on assets of illicit origin (LVP). Findings The two Swiss legislative initiatives that will be examined (LRAI and LVP) are innovative in nature, but serious weaknesses and obstacles to asset recovery remain unaddressed. Despite their flaws, these two legislative innovations can inspire positive change in international and national norms. They can be viewed as part of a work-in-progress for the reinforcement of asset recovery proceedings and international cooperation in this domain. Originality/value Since the new law on asset recovery (LVP) came into force (July 1, 2016), this has been the first study examining the strengths and weaknesses of the adopted text, its compatibility with human rights standards and its potential influence on international standards of asset recovery.

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“…11 A ‘beneficial owner’ is ‘a natural person – that is, a real, live human being, not another company or trust – who directly or indirectly exercises substantial control over the company or receives substantial economic benefits from the company’ (Global Witness, 2013: 3). Key features therefore are the control exercised and the benefit derived (Van der Does de Willebois et al, 2011: 3). A detailed analysis of 213 grand corruption cases between 1980 and 2010 identified that over 70 percent (150) involved the use of at least one corporate vehicle that concealed, at least in part, beneficial ownership.…”

Section: The Finances From Transnational Corporate Briberymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A detailed analysis of 213 grand corruption cases between 1980 and 2010 identified that over 70 percent (150) involved the use of at least one corporate vehicle that concealed, at least in part, beneficial ownership. In total, 817 corporate vehicles were used in those 150 cases and the UK, its Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, was the jurisdiction with the second-highest (after the US) number of registered corporate vehicles (see Van der Does de Willebois et al, 2011). Furthermore, such corporate vehicles are being used to ‘launder’ corrupt monies via the UK’s property market, where more than 100,000 property titles totalling £122 billion in value in England and Wales are registered to overseas companies, including over 36,000 properties in London, with no record of the beneficial owners ( Financial Times , 2015; see, for an online dataset, http://www.private-eye.co.uk/registry).…”

Section: The Finances From Transnational Corporate Briberymentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizing the finances for and the finances from transnational corporate bribery

Lord

Levi

2016

European Journal of Criminology

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Abstract:This article analyses the finances for and the finances from corporate bribery in international business transactions and how they are organised. Transnational corporate bribery involves non-criminal commercial enterprises that operate in licit markets but that use corrupt means to win or maintain business contracts in foreign jurisdictions. This article first considers what needs to be financed, how much finance is needed, and how the bribes can be generated and distributed. Second, the article considers the different forms of proceeds that emerge out of the bribery, how offenders must conceal the derivation of funds from these crimes while also retaining control over them, and how they must overcome particular obstacles. Finally, the article discusses responses to the proceeds of bribery and related anti-money laundering provisions, before analysing actual and potential mechanisms for intervening with the finances for and from transnational corporate corruption.

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The Puppet Masters

Cited by 62 publications

References 0 publications

Politically exposed entities: how to tailor PEP requirements to PEP owned legal entities

Politically exposed entities: how to tailor PEP requirements to PEP owned legal entities

Asset recovery: a Swiss leap forward?

Organizing the finances for and the finances from transnational corporate bribery

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