The public interest hypothesis revisited: A new test of Peltzman's theory of regulation

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

“…Negative, ambiguous or insignificant effects are reported in Becker (1986), Cahan and Kaempfer (1992), Pincus (1975), Quinn and Shapiro (1991), and Salamon and Siegfried (1977). free riding problem.…”

“…Moreover, a group may have more influence at one time than at another time, or book a 33 For a negative effect, see Miller (1991), Plotnick (1986), Trefler (1993), Young (1991), fbr a positive effect, see, e.g., Abler (1991), Becker (1986), Boucher (1991), Congleton and Shugart (1990), Kristov et al (1992), Leigh (1994), Pincus (1975), Renaud and Van Winden (1991), Stigler (1971), for ambiguous or insignificant effects, see Graddy and Nichol (1989), Michaels (1992), Neck and Schneider (1988), Nelson (1982), Renaud and Van Winden (1988), Salamon and Siegfried (1977).…”

“…Finally, and less ambiguous perhaps, is the suggestion that a well-informed constituency makes congress less susceptible to the demands of special interests and more prone to serve the public interest. 43 Becker (1986), for instance, finds that it is harder for the dentist profession to obtain entry restrictions if a state is characterized by a well-educated electorate. Graddy and Nichol (1989) obtain the same result for registered nurses.…”

Knowledge flows and insider trading

“…Both consumer and producer interests receive due consideration in regulatory decision-making (Keeler 1984;Primaux et al 1984;Becker 1986). Rectifying the ambiguous problem of who insiders are furthers this consumer-producer approach by focusing on information flows.…”

Pricing in the nuclear power industry: Public or private interest?

“…Therefore, when redistributions of wealth are small, the interests of the industrial-class users are likely to dominate those of the residential-class users. However, as Levine (1981), Keeler (1984), Becker (1986), Goodman and Porter (1988), and Bonbright, Danielsen, and Kamerschen (1988: 44-56) have pointed out, when residential-class customers recognize they have lost wealth through regulation, they become informed voters and affect the regulatory process.…”