“…To some degree this reflects the nature of contemporary politics. Since the attacks in New York in 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, the categories of moderation and extremism have become part of everyday discourse as Muslims in particular have been construed in terms of this dichotomy (for examples of psychological theorizing on so‐called religious extremism and moderation, see Loza, 2007; Schmidt, Joffé, & Davar, 2005). Whether such taxonomies are likely to help analytically is, as we have already discussed, not at all clear.…”
Section: From Categories Of Analysis To Categories Of Practicementioning
Much psychological research employs the categories of extremism and moderation as categories of analysis (e.g. to identify the psychological bases for, and consequences of, holding certain positions). This paper argues these categorizations inevitably reflect one's values and taken-for-granted assumptions about social reality and that their use as analytic categories limits our ability to explore what is really important: social actors' own constructions of social reality. In turn we argue that if we are to focus on this latter, there may be merit in exploring how social actors themselves use the categories of moderation and extremism to construct their own terms of reference. That is we propose to re-conceptualize the categories of moderation and extremism as categories of practice rather than analysis. The utility of this approach is illustrated with qualitative data. We argue that these data illustrate the importance of respecting social actors' own constructions of social reality (rather than imposing our own). Moreover, we argue that categories of moderation and extremism may be employed by social actors in diverse ways to construct different terms of reference and so recruit support for different identity-related projects.
“…To some degree this reflects the nature of contemporary politics. Since the attacks in New York in 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, the categories of moderation and extremism have become part of everyday discourse as Muslims in particular have been construed in terms of this dichotomy (for examples of psychological theorizing on so‐called religious extremism and moderation, see Loza, 2007; Schmidt, Joffé, & Davar, 2005). Whether such taxonomies are likely to help analytically is, as we have already discussed, not at all clear.…”
Section: From Categories Of Analysis To Categories Of Practicementioning
Much psychological research employs the categories of extremism and moderation as categories of analysis (e.g. to identify the psychological bases for, and consequences of, holding certain positions). This paper argues these categorizations inevitably reflect one's values and taken-for-granted assumptions about social reality and that their use as analytic categories limits our ability to explore what is really important: social actors' own constructions of social reality. In turn we argue that if we are to focus on this latter, there may be merit in exploring how social actors themselves use the categories of moderation and extremism to construct their own terms of reference. That is we propose to re-conceptualize the categories of moderation and extremism as categories of practice rather than analysis. The utility of this approach is illustrated with qualitative data. We argue that these data illustrate the importance of respecting social actors' own constructions of social reality (rather than imposing our own). Moreover, we argue that categories of moderation and extremism may be employed by social actors in diverse ways to construct different terms of reference and so recruit support for different identity-related projects.
“…Often, especially in popular culture and media, such diagnoses are wholly individualised and pre-sociological, while, in other cases, wider conditioning factors are considered. Of the latter, totalitarian state systems, for instance, may have invaded the psyche, or exposure to political violence made individuals susceptible to extremism (Canetti et al, 2013; Schmidt et al, 2005). At a further explanatory level, in a more Freudian vein, it is possible that entire groups, cultures and civilisations can be pathological – that certain ‘sociopsychological features’ of particular human collectivities are indicative of ‘latent extremism’ (Zinchenko, 2014: 29).…”
“…2. Here, we have drawn from the following works: Bollinger (1986), Fiske (2013), Gelfand et al (2013), Hardin (2002), Harrington (2013), Klein and Kruglanski (2013), Lipset (1998), Midlarsky (2011), Mudde (2014), Saucier et al (2009), Schmidt et al (2005), Wintrobe (2014).…”
The rising fortunes of the academic ‘extremism industry’ call for robust social scientific scrutiny. We contend this industry is a significant expression of our current moment of post-hegemonic liberalism. We set out the typical definitional devices found in the literature, which assemble ‘extremism’ as a syndrome consisting of six major elements: non-normative values, anti-democracy, anti-liberalism, utopianism and a war on the present, totalisation and abstraction, justifications of unlawfulness. The extremism industry can be approached by way of three investigative spaces: modernisation approaches, psychological and culturalist explanations, and security and policing approaches. Within these spaces, we outline five ideal-typical modes of explaining extremism: consensual anti-fascism, civilisational provincialism, folk secularism, psychologistic pathologisation and moral educationism. We maintain that the extremism industry is analytically weak and politically pernicious and suggest that what passes for ‘extremism’ is better situated and understood at the crossroad of three important vectors: intellectual, geo-political and world-economic.
“…Donald Trump, the quintessential highly charismatic leader, has risen to power by appearing to espouse unapologetic certainty that has both fueled and been fueled by the increasingly regressed, dependent group's paranoid emotional fires. He is the group ego ideal (Freud, ) attempting to lead an idealized object, the American state (Schmidt, Joffe, & Davar, ). His manic, authoritarian psychology appears to not be tethered to truth nor to objective reality but is rather an “assault on reality” (Lifton, ).…”
The contemporary American right wing is predominantly composed of White working‐class and wealthier White Americans who, according to recent research, report profound fears of cultural displacement and the loss of American exceptionalism. This group's dynamics and processes, the psychologies of its leader, Donald Trump, and component members, and its associated versions of certain foundational American myths and fantasies contain significant elements of both narcissism and paranoia. These myths include that of America being a divine “City Upon a Hill,” the story of the idyllic, pre‐Civil War “Old South,” and the Horatio Alger myth of “bootstrapping” up the economic ladder. These idealized, fantasied narratives are manipulated and exploited by those in positions of power, thus exacerbating members' fear, shame, and rage. Increased understanding of these psychological phenomena can aid psychoanalysts in consulting about and, when possible, engaging directly with these individuals, especially when facing significant psychological, sociocultural, and political obstacles.
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