The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy

Nonproliferation Information and Attitude Change: Evidence From South Korea

“…Previous studies have debated the futility of the NPT. Pessimists mainly emphasize its institutional weakness that the threat of punishment cannot sufficiently deter determined proliferators (Hymans 2006). Optimists, however, argue that material and non-material costs of NPT violations, such as economic sanctions and loss of international reputation, pressure states to comply with the NPT obligations (Müller and Schmidt 2010;Rublee 2009;Solingen 2009).…”

“…1. Several studies that decompose state-level decisions into "one or more domestic prisms" (Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2010) examine leader-specific features, such as leaders' past experiences (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015), leaders' preference for economic growth (Solingen 2009), and leaders' national identity conceptions (Hymans 2006), or institutional features, such as bureaucratic interests (Sagan 1996) and civil-military relations (Narang 2017). 2.…”

“…Instead of using self-reported attitude strength measures, we allow respondents to reveal their attitude strengths in the three-step opinion change experiment. In this way, we could better understand which individual-level attributes such as demographic/social-economic status, beliefs on the utility of nuclear weapons as instruments in international relations (Hymans 2006;Sechser et al 2013;Volpe 2017), knowledge on nuclear security affect pro-armament subjects' attitude strength and therefore make them either receptive or resistant to nonproliferation information.…”

Kantian nonideal theory and nuclear proliferation

“…Instead, it should address the state-or regime-level insecurities and humiliations that provide reason for nuclear-threshold states to abandon nonproliferation commitments (see, e.g. Campbell et al, 2004;Hymans, 2006;Solingen, 2007;Doyle, 2009a, b). It should recognize that nuclear aspirant motivations are in turn framed by particular moral psychologies, both religious and secular (see, e.g.…”

“…It should recognize that nuclear aspirant motivations are in turn framed by particular moral psychologies, both religious and secular (see, e.g. Hashmi and Lee, 2004;Hymans, 2006). The values expressed by these beliefs are themselves anchored to diverse ethical commitments about the collective good, natural and political rights, and obligations that attend international legal agreements.…”