The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories

Abstract

What psychological factors drive the popularity of conspiracy theories, which explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review the current research and find that it answers the first of these questions more thoroughly than the second. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be driven by motives that can be characterized as epistemic (understanding one’s environment), existential (being safe and in control of one’s environment), and social (maintaining a positive image of the self and the social group). However, little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and to date, this research does not indicate that conspiracy belief fulfills people’s motivations. Instead, for many people, conspiracy belief may be more appealing than satisfying. Further research is needed to determine for whom, and under what conditions, conspiracy theories may satisfy key psychological motives.

The role of system identity threat in conspiracy theory endorsement

“…Building on existing perspectives characterizing conspiracy belief as a motivated response to perceived threat (e.g., Jolley et al., ), the current study explored the role of a thus‐far unexamined psychological variable: SI threat , or the sense that society's fundamental, defining values are under siege due to social change. Prior research indicates that perceptions of threat—whether to one's sense of control, certainty, or security—can increase conspiracy thinking (e.g., Crocker et al., ; Kay et al., ; Kramer, ; Sullivan et al., ; Whitson & Galinsky, ), since conspiracy thinking and conspiracy‐theory endorsement can imbue meaning to complex, threatening phenomena (Douglas et al., ; Graeupner & Coman, ; Miller et al., ; Sunstein & Vermeule, ; Uscinski & Parent, ). Consistent with this, we reasoned that perceived threat to one's conception of society and what it means to be a member of society would be associated with conspiracy thinking style, which would, in turn, bolster endorsement of both ideological and non‐ideological CTs.…”

“…For example, individuals who are sensitive to threats to order and structure (Abalakina‐Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, ; Swami, ) or to uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, ) are more prone to conspiracy thinking. As such, scholars have suggested that CT endorsement may fulfill psychological needs for certainty and security (e.g., Douglas et al., ). Consistent with this, Marchlewska, Cichocka, and Kossowska () found that individuals high in the need for cognitive closure were more likely to endorse conspiracy‐oriented reasons for events (e.g., a plane crash; but see Leman & Cinnirella, ).…”

Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain

“…One limitation of the current state of affairs in the scientific research domain of conspiracy theories, however, is that the field is lacking a solid theoretical framework that contextualizes previous findings, that enables novel predictions, and that suggests interventions to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy theories in society. Recent review articles have sought to address this limitation by providing a framework that illuminates the motivational basis of conspiracy theories—specifically that conspiracy theories appeal to people for epistemic, existential and social motivational reasons (Douglas et al., ), and by developing an evolutionary model—the Adaptive Conspiracism Hypothesis—that specifies how the human tendency to believe conspiracy theories evolved through natural selection (Van Prooijen & Van Vugt, in press). These initiatives notwithstanding, at present the field of conspiracy theories is still in its infancy in terms of theory development.…”

“…The second social motivation is to protect against a coalition or outgroup suspected to be hostile. This outgroup typically has some threatening quality, such as power (e.g., politicians; managers) or negative stereotypes (e.g., minority groups) which reinforces people's suspicion towards these groups (Douglas et al., ; Van Prooijen & Van Lange, ). Thus, the combination of a strong ingroup identity and a sense of outgroup threat characterize the social dimension of conspiracy beliefs.…”

How paranoid are conspiracy believers? Toward a more fine‐grained understanding of the connect and disconnect between paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories

“…Similar antecedents have been proposed—and empirically established—for belief in conspiracy theories (“detecting” secret patterns of intentionality): Lacking control increases conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, ; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, ; Van Prooijen & Acker, ; Whitson & Galinsky, ). Specifically, although it remains debatable whether seeing through the hostile intent of others (in the case of paranoia) or the evil plots of secret, powerful groups (in the case of conspiracies) really fulfills the goal of experiencing more control over one's life (Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, ), these two forms of coping seem to respond to a similar need.…”