The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox

Nagel, Jennifer

doi:10.1017/9781108379755.004

Cited by 7 publications

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“…Again, this is rebutted in Nagel (2021). Nagel shows that, in fact, the opposite intuition to HRS's is also taken to be obvious (e.g., in Staffel 2016in Staffel : 1725.…”

Section: Lotteriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is widely acknowledged among philosophers interested in ordinary language belief ascriptions that think is often more natural than believe. Nagel (2021) provides some evidence beyond the armchair: "in a balanced corpus of written and spoken English, these are the 12th-and 50th-most common verbs, respectively (Davies and Gardner 2010, 317), and in spoken language, 'think' is more than six times as common as 'believe' ([Corpus of Contemporary American English], accessed November 13, 2018)".…”

Section: Fifty Ways To Believe Your Lover: Other Ordinary Ways To Att...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strong Belief is Ordinary

Clarke

2022

Episteme

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In an influential recent paper, Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (“HRS”) argue that belief is weak. More precisely: they argue that the referent of believe in ordinary language is much weaker than epistemologists usually suppose; that one needs very little evidence to be entitled to believe a proposition in this sense; and that the referent of believe in ordinary language just is the ordinary concept of belief. I argue here to the contrary. HRS identify two alleged tests of weakness – the neg-raising and weak upper bounds tests, as I call them – which they claim believe and think pass. But I identify several other expressions in ordinary English for attributing belief, all of which fail both tests. Therefore, even if HRS are correct that believe and think refer to a weak attitude, it does not follow that the ordinary concept of belief is weak. I conclude by raising some problems for the accounts of belief as guessing, building on HRS's arguments, due to Kevin Dorst, Matt Mandelkern, and Ben Holguín.

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“…Again, this is rebutted in Nagel (2021). Nagel shows that, in fact, the opposite intuition to HRS's is also taken to be obvious (e.g., in Staffel 2016in Staffel : 1725.…”

Section: Lotteriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fifty Ways To Believe Your Lover: Other Ordinary Ways To Att...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strong Belief is Ordinary

Clarke

2022

Episteme

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“…The evidential requirements on thinking that p are weaker than the 6. Some theorists-e.g., Stanley (2008), Nagel (2021), and Williamson (forthcoming)-have suggested that sentences of the form 'I think/believe that p' have uses on which they don't report the fact that speaker thinks/believes that p. Instead, they serve some other function: say to "hedge" one's assertion, or to express (or otherwise make salient) the fact that speaker's evidence for the proposition that p is relatively weak. But I find it hard to see the dialectical relevance of this observation, since presumably the best explanation of why they have these functions is that the epistemic requirements on thinking are weak.…”

Section: Weaknessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking, Guessing, and Believing

Holguín

2022

Philosophers' Imprint

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License 1. Kaplan (1995) is a notable exception. James (1956) too, though I'm not sure he's part of the intended reference class. 2. See Dorst (2019) and Rothschild (2020) for further developments. ben holguínThinking, Guessing, and Believing 4. See, e.g., Greco (2015, p. 180), who in defense of the view that "believing" that p requires having credence 1 that p writes:If the claim that belief involves maximal confidence is to be worth taking seriously at all, we cannot be working with a conception of belief closely tied to natural language constructions involving 'belief' and 'believe'. Much work in epistemology suggests an alternative conception of belief, more closely related to knowledge. . . When belief is understood along some versions of these lines, the simple view that (strong) belief involves credence 1 is once again a live option. 5.See, e.g., Nagel (2021) and Williamson (forthcoming).philosophers' imprint -2vol. 22, no. 6 (february 2022) ben holguínThinking, Guessing, and Believing arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that 'thinks' is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that, in many cases, what one thinks on certain matters is in a very literal sense a choice. Finally, if, as it seems, thinking just is believing, then all this goes for belief as well.

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“…While the use of corpus methods in philosophy dates back to at least the 1970's-e.g., Meuiner et al (1976), McKinnon (1970); thanks to Louis Chartrand for making me aware of this work-their use has expanded in recent years. A non-exhaustive list of recent, English-language work in philosophy employing or discussing corpus methods broadly construed includes: Ludlow (2005), Meunier et al (2005), de Villiers et al (2007), Knobe and Prinz (2008), Wright and Bartsch (2008), Reuter (2011), Sainte-Marie et al (2011), Slingerland and Chudek (2011), Herbelot et al (2012), Bluhm (2013Bluhm ( , 2016, Nagel (2013Nagel ( , 2021, Overton (2013), Tallant (2013), Vetter (2014), Andow (2015aAndow ( , 2015b, Fischer et al (2015, forthcoming), Liao et al (2016), Nichols et al (2016), Wright et al (2016), Pence (2016, forthcoming), Ramsey and Pence (2016), Allen et al (2017), Fischer and Engelhardt (2017), Hahn et al (2017), Murdock et al (2017), Schwitzgebel and Dicey Jennings (2017), Sytsma and Reuter (2017), Alfano et al (2018), Nichols and Pinillos (2018), van Wierst et al (2018), Pence and Ramsey (2018), Alfano and Cheong (2019), Betti et al (2019), …”

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confidence: 99%

Ordinary Meaning and Consilience of Evidence

Sytsma¹

2023

Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law

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In this chapter I note two recent trends, one in experimental jurisprudence and one in experimental philosophy. First, some work in experimental jurisprudence has pushed for moving beyond textual sources, including the use of linguistic corpora, and toward questionnaire methods in analyzing ordinary meaning. Second, some work in experimental philosophy has urged that we should look to move beyond the use of questionnaire methods and toward the use of linguistic corpora in analyzing ordinary concepts. There is a methodological tension here that suggests further investigation. I do so by considering the legal hypothetical of a prohibition on vehicles in a park that has featured prominently in the back-and-forth over the use of corpus methods in legal interpretation. Taking a closer look at this example, including extending previous corpus analyses, I argue that corpus and questionnaire methods in fact paint a remarkably similar picture of the ordinary use of "vehicle." I hold that this highlights how these methods can compliment each other, and conclude that when it comes to difficult empirical questions-such as those that arise in assessing ordinary meaning and ordinary concepts-we should aim to employ multiple sources of information to arrive at a consilience of evidence.Both philosophy and legal interpretation are often concerned with assessing the ordinary meaning of important terms or phrases (or with the concepts beings expressed by those terms when used with their ordinary meaning). 2 And researchers in both areas have begun to urge that ordinary meaning is an empirical question. Interestingly, some recent work in these areas suggests seemingly opposed views about the use of one source of empirical evidence in investigating ordinary meaning-the tools of corpus linguistics. Some work in experimental jurisprudence has pushed for moving beyond textual sources, including the use of linguistic corpora, and toward survey methods in legal interpretation (Tobia 2020, Klapper et al. forthcoming). In fact, Klapper et al. seem to suggest that we should prefer survey methods over 1 Forthcoming in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law edited by Stefan Magen and Karolina Prochownik. I want to thank Eugen Fischer, Kevin Tobia, and Pascale Willemsen for their extremely helpful suggestions. 2 This is not to say that researchers in these areas are after exactly the same thing, and indeed legal interpretation typically focuses on the ordinary or public meaning of a term given the context of some legal text, while philosophers tend to focus on analyzing ordinary concepts more generally, even if this is sometimes restricted to certain contexts (such as that provided by a given thought experiment).

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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox

Cited by 7 publications

References 208 publications

Strong Belief is Ordinary

Strong Belief is Ordinary

Thinking, Guessing, and Believing

Ordinary Meaning and Consilience of Evidence

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