The provisionality of property rights in Kant's<i>Doctrine of Right</i>

Hasan, Rafeeq

doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1429181

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“… 14 The principle of right refers only to the relationship between choices and states, such that the exercise of one’s own freedom should not infringe the freedom of others, but it says nothing with regard to external objects of choice and the possibility of possessing them juridically. Hasan argues that the postulate must be grounded on the universal principle of right (Hasan 2018: 863). As I see it, the postulate (i.e.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property and the Will: Kant and Achenwall on Ownership Rights

Tomassini

2023

Kantian rev.

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This article examines Kant’s theory of property through a comparative analysis of Gottfried Achenwall’s justification of ownership rights. I argue that at the core of Achenwall’s and Kant’s understanding of ownership rights lies the idea that rights are to be acquired through a juridical act (factum iuridicum, rechtlichen Act) of the will. However, while Achenwall thinks of this act as emerging from a private will, Kant holds that rights and obligations can only be brought about by an act of the general will. By contrasting these two views, I aim to illuminate one of the main features of Kant’s theory of property, namely, that ownership rights are only possible in a rightfully constituted state. I conclude with a suggestion regarding Kant’s view of the notion of ‘provisional’ possession in the state of nature.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property and the Will: Kant and Achenwall on Ownership Rights

Tomassini

2023

Kantian rev.

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“…Provisional claims have to yield in the case that they conflict with principles of right. 58 Importantly, if the provisionality thesis is true, then it is not just my holdings that might need to yield in cases of conflict, but also states' rights to lay down laws and police their borders. Indeed, for Kant, the authority of lawgivers amounts to the moral power to bind those who are within their jurisdiction through laws and sanctions imposed by their 'mere choice'.…”

Section: Refugee Status and The Provsionality Of Acquired Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resistance at the Border: Kantian Political Theory and the Refugee Crisis

Messina¹

2021

J Applied Philosophy

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On a certain orthodox Kantian view, when states violate migrants' rights to enter a foreign country , citizens of that country must comply with the laws and refrain from helping them gain access. After all, (i) philanthropic efforts are strictly subordinated to questions of right, and (ii) an important precondition of right is recognition of the state's authority to determine what counts as right in practice. Moreover, because the state has a mandate to control its borders, fixing rules for entry lies squarely within its jurisdiction. If its determination is unjust by some substantive standard, citizens ought to protest and campaign against it. But they may not violate it. Against this, I argue that the best understanding of Kantian political principles does not entail these conclusions. Rather, citizens may resist the state's pronouncements on matters like this and aid refugees in gaining entry to their target country, as long as they can do so without (a) compromising the stability of the state or (b) violating their neighbors' rights.Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of right, so that hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the right to be a guest … but the right to visit, to present oneself to society, belongs to all human beings by virtue of the right of possession in common with the earth's surface, on which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one another. 1 Both philanthropy and respect for the rights of the human being are duties: but the former is only a conditional duty whereas the latter is unconditional duty, commanding absolutely, and whoever wants to give himself up to the sweet feeling of beneficence must first be completely assured that he has not transgressed this unconditional duty. 2

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“…Without the state, any property rights are merely provisionalnot in fact binding of justice. (Kant 1797, VI.255;Ripstein 2009, 165;Stilz 2009, 45;Hasan 2018;Messina 2019) What this means is that we have no enforceable duty to comply with them, at least not yet. In the following section we will see the precise details of why the state becomes 12 Ripstein believes that only one of the three problems that arise for property also arises for bodily rights (nonassurance) (2009 176-181).…”

Section: Kantian Rightmentioning

confidence: 99%