“…In light of the centrality of various cognitive capacities for prominent theories of personhood (Singer, 1993;Korsgaard, 1996;McMahan, 2002) and recent discussions about how the idea of the brain as the basis of the self applies to issues in DBS in particular (Byram and Reiner, 2014;Mecacci and Haselager, 2014;Racine et al, 2017), a natural question to ask about NAD is whether it may be especially sensitive on this or some other basis. This issue forms part of the broader question of neuro-exceptionalism: whether and to what extent neurotechnologies raise special ethical, legal, social, and policy issues (Illes and Racine, 2005;Schick, 2005;Alpert, 2007;Tovino, 2007;Wachbroit, 2008). Scholars have engaged in analogous discussions regarding HIV exceptionalism (Bayer, 1991;Ross, 2001;April, 2010;O'Hara, 2011) and genetic exceptionalism (Rothstein, 2010;Garrison et al, 2019;Martani et al, 2019).…”