The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward seeking

Seabrooke, Tina; Hogarth, Lee; Mitchell, Chris

doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1115885

Cited by 29 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 49 publications

(73 reference statements)

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“…Consistent with prior studies, the Non-Reversal No Load group demonstrated an O-R priming effect, where the reward cues selectively increased the response that predicted the common outcome (e.g., Hogarth, 2012;Martinovic et al, 2014;Seabrooke et al, 2016. Furthermore, an O-R priming effect was observed even under cognitive load.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

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Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice

Seabrooke

Wills

Hogarth

et al. 2018

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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The extent to which human outcome-response (O-R) priming effects are automatic or under cognitive control is currently unclear. Two experiments tested the effect of cognitive load on O-R priming to shed further light on the debate. In Experiment 1, two instrumental responses earned beer and chocolate points in an instrumental training phase. Instrumental response choice was then tested in the presence of beer, chocolate, and neutral stimuli. On test, a Reversal instruction group was told that the stimuli signalled which response would not be rewarded. The transfer test was also conducted under either minimal (No Load) or considerable (Load) cognitive load. The Non-Reversal groups showed O-R priming effects, where the reward cues increased the instrumental responses that had previously produced those outcomes, relative to the neutral stimulus. This effect was observed even under cognitive load. The Reversal No Load group demonstrated a reversed effect, where response choice was biased towards the response that was most likely to be rewarded according to the instruction. Most importantly, response choice was at chance in the Reversal Load condition. In Experiment 2, cognitive load abolished the sensitivity to outcome devaluation that was otherwise seen when multiple outcomes and responses were cued on test. Collectively, the results demonstrate that complex O-R priming effects are sensitive to cognitive load, whereas the very simple, standard O-R priming effect is more robust.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

“…throughout the transfer test. We used this instruction to be consisted with our previous work (Seabrooke et al, 2016), where we observed very strong reversal effects. The Load groups also completed a cognitive load task (described below) during the transfer test.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice

Seabrooke

Wills

Hogarth

et al. 2018

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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“…A third theory of PIT is our goal-directed, propositional model (Hogarth et al, 2014;Seabrooke et al, 2016Seabrooke et al, , 2017. Similar to hierarchical theory, participants are assumed to infer that the Pavlovian stimuli signal which outcomes are more available, and therefore which instrumental response is more likely to be reinforced on any given test trial.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extinguishing cue-controlled reward choice: Effects of Pavlovian extinction on outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Seabrooke¹,

Pelley²,

Porter³

et al. 2018

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cogniti

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Outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) refers to the finding that presenting Pavlovian predictors of outcomes can enhance the vigor of instrumental responding for those same outcomes. Three experiments examined the sensitivity of outcome-selective PIT to Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) extinction. In Experiment 1, participants first learnt to perform different instrumental responses to earn different outcomes. In a separate Pavlovian training phase, certain stimuli were established as Pavlovian signals of the different outcomes. Some of these Pavlovian stimuli were then extinguished (they were presented alone, without any outcome), while others were not. A final transfer test measured the extent to which these Pavlovian cues biased instrumental response choice. Consistent with previous work, the observed PIT effects were immune to Pavlovian extinction; the non-extinguished and extinguished cues produced PIT effects that did not significantly differ in size. In Experiment 2, response choice was tested in the presence of compound stimuli that included both extinguished and non-extinguished cues. Response choice was highly sensitive to the extinction manipulation under these circumstances. Experiment 3 tested whether this sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction was a direct effect of the associative strength of the Pavlovian cues present, or an indirect effect of cue salience. The results provide unique evidence to suggest that PIT is a direct consequence of the strength of the Pavlovian associations. (PsycINFO Database Record

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“…To solve this contradiction, a range of secondary processes have been postulated wherein drug seeking becomes less controlled. Theories that appeal to appetitive Pavlovian conditioning, for instance, argue that the pairing of drug cues with drug reward endows drug cues with capacity to elicit drug seeking, and sensitivity to this effect may underpin dependence [1,[17][18][19][20], because cue-reactivity is automatic [21], or because drug cues signal the accessibility (and hence greater utility) of the drug in the presence of drug cues [22,23]. However, drug cue-reactivity is not reliably associated with dependence severity in humans [24][25][26][27], suggesting this mechanism probably does not underpin addiction.…”

Section: Brief Introduction To Theories Of Addictionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Addiction is driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice under negative affect: translational critique of habit and compulsion theory

Hogarth

2020

Neuropsychopharmacol.

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Drug addiction may be a goal-directed choice driven by excessive drug value in negative affective states, a habit driven by strong stimulus−response associations, or a compulsion driven by insensitivity to costs imposed on drug seeking. Laboratory animal and human evidence for these three theories is evaluated. Excessive goal theory is supported by dependence severity being associated with greater drug choice/economic demand. Drug choice is demonstrably goal-directed (driven by the expected value of the drug) and can be augmented by stress/negative mood induction and withdrawal-effects amplified in those with psychiatric symptoms and drug use coping motives. Furthermore, psychiatric symptoms confer risk of dependence, and coping motives mediate this risk. Habit theory of addiction has weaker support. Habitual behaviour seen in drug-exposed animals often does not occur in complex decision scenarios, or where responding is rewarded, so habit is unlikely to explain most human addictive behaviour where these conditions apply. Furthermore, most human studies have not found greater propensity to habitual behaviour in drug users or as a function of dependence severity, and the minority that have can be explained by task disengagement producing impaired explicit contingency knowledge. Compulsion theory of addiction also has weak support. The persistence of punished drug seeking in animals is better explained by greater drug value (evinced by the association with economic demand) than by insensitivity to costs. Furthermore, human studies have provided weak evidence that propensity to discount cost imposed on drug seeking is associated with dependence severity. These data suggest that human addiction is primarily driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice under negative affect, and less by habit or compulsion. Addiction is pathological because negative states powerfully increase expected drug value acutely outweighing abstinence goals.

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The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward seeking

Cited by 29 publications

References 49 publications

Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice

Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice

Extinguishing cue-controlled reward choice: Effects of Pavlovian extinction on outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Addiction is driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice under negative affect: translational critique of habit and compulsion theory

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