The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

Antiduality in Exact Partition Games

“…Branzei et al (2006)) nor the procedural egalitarian solution (cf. Dietzenbacher et al (2017)) is self-antidual. However, these solutions are contained in some self-antidual solutions.…”

The Procedural Egalitarian Solution and Egalitarian Stable Games

“…We focus on the procedural egalitarian solution introduced by Dietzenbacher et al (2017). This solution is based on the result of an iterative procedure in which intercoalitional egalitarian considerations are central.…”

“…Let TU N es denote the class of all egalitarian stable games. Dietzenbacher et al (2017) showed that convex games are egalitarian stable, and that egalitarian stable games are balanced. For two-player games, egalitarian stability is equivalent to convexity and balancedness.…”

“…If members of a society agree upon a certain core allocation without being aware of their own role, then it is plausible that the selected allocation will not be modified when the set of alternatives shrinks. Dietzenbacher et al (2017) showed that the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies symmetry. We show that the procedural egalitarian solution also satisfies core contraction independence and derive a third axiomatic characterization in terms of coalitional rationality, aggregate monotonicity, and these two properties.…”

“…Sharkey (1982) This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 formally describes the procedural egalitarian solution based on Dietzenbacher et al (2017) and derives some useful elementary results. Section 3 formulates several axiomatic characterizations, discusses the computational implications, and presents connections with other egalitarian concepts.…”