The problem with descriptive correctness

Kaplan, Jeffrey

doi:10.1111/rati.12257

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Many analytic philosophers of language support the claim that meaning is a normative notion (cf. Boghossian, 1989; Buleandra, 2008; Brandom, 1994, 2000; Ebbs, 1997; Gampel, 1997; Ginsborg, 2011; Kaplan, 2020; Kiesselbach, 2014, 2020; Kripke, 1982; McDowell, 1984, 1994; Millar, 2002; Peregrin, 2012, 2014; Whiting, 2007, 2009, 2016). However, a growing number of works cast doubt on the idea that meaning is normative (Bilgrami, 1993; Boghossian, 2005; Glüer, 1999; Glüer & Pagin, 1999; Glüer & Wikforss, 2015, 2022; Hattiangadi, 2006, 2007; Honkasalo, 2022; Reinikainen, 2020; Wikforss, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Kaluziński

2023

Theoria

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In this paper, I focus on the idea that language is a rule‐constituted and rule‐governed practice. This notion has been criticised recently. It has been claimed that, even if linguistic meaning is determined by rules, these rules are not genuinely normative because they do not govern actions within the practice by themselves. It has been emphasised that one needs to consent (e.g., has relevant intention or desire) to be a part of that practice. First, I distinguish between two issues: (1) How do rules come to life? (and the answer to that question is by enactment or communal acceptance), and (2) does being assessed by the standards set by the rules require some form of consent for one's actions to be evaluated by these standards? Then, I demonstrate how, by introducing the notion of “default normativity”, one can defend the idea that there are normative practices that are constituted and governed by rules and that language is one of them.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Kaluziński

2023

Theoria

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Linguistic Mistakes

Reiland

2021

Erkenn

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Ever since the publication of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there’s been a raging debate in philosophy of language over whether meaning and thought are, in some sense, normative. Most participants in the normativity wars seem to agree that some uses of meaningful expressions are semantically correct while disagreeing over whether this entails anything normative. But what is it to say that a use of an expression is semantically correct? On the so-called orthodox construal, it is to say that it doesn’t result in a factual mistake, that is, in saying or thinking something false. On an alternative construal it is instead to say that it doesn’t result in a distinctively linguistic mistake, that is, in misusing the expression. It is natural to think that these two construals of semantic correctness are simply about different things and not necessarily in competition with each other. However, this is not the common view. Instead, several philosophers who subscribe to the orthodox construal have argued that the alternative construal of correctness as use in accordance with meaning doesn’t make any sense, partly because there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes (Whiting in Inquiry, 59:219–238, 2016, Wikforss in Philos Stud 102:203–226, 2001). In this paper I develop and defend the idea that there’s a distinctively linguistic notion of correctness as use in accordance with meaning and argue that there are clear cases of linguistic mistakes.

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Is semantic correctness descriptive?

Honkasalo

2022

Theoria

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According to the normativists, dispositionalist theories of meaning fail because meaning is normative, not descriptive. One way to understand this notion of normativity is in terms of semantic correctness conditions. Anti‐normativists typically accept that meaning implies semantic correctness but deny that this in turn implies that meaning is normative. Jeffrey Kaplan has recently argued that while semantic correctness may not imply full‐blown normativity, semantic correctness is not descriptive either. I contend that Kaplan's argument has two main problems. First, his focus on dispositionalism leaves it open for other descriptive facts to provide the basis of semantic correctness conditions. Second, he fails to show that the problems of dispositionalism are connected to semantic correctness in a way that demonstrates problems with descriptive theories of meaning.

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The problem with descriptive correctness

Cited by 3 publications

References 34 publications

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Linguistic Mistakes

Is semantic correctness descriptive?

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