The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology

Sanford, David H.

doi:10.2307/2215757

Cited by 54 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…One possibility would be to argue that the Special Composition Question is unanswerable, or otherwise misguided, and ought to be replaced with various kind‐specific instances of the Special Special Composition Question. David Sanford (, 223–224) in effect says this, as does Amie Thomasson (, chapter 7). Another, closely related possibility would be to take the Special Composition Question to be answered by disjoining all the answers to the instances of the Special Special Composition Question.…”

Section: Two Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Part and Whole, Again1

Bennett

2017

Philosophical Issues

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Section: Two Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Part and Whole, Again1

Bennett

2017

Philosophical Issues

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“…Moreover, the universalist response seems to get us lots of extraordinary objects (such as the mereological sum of my nose and the Eiffel Tower) as well, so it could hardly be said to provide a common sense ontology overall even if it did affirm the existence of ordinary objects. (For responses to arguments against ordinary objects based on the special composition question, see Sanford 1993; Lowe 2005, 516; Thomasson 2007, 126–36).…”

Section: Why Is There a Controversy About The Existence Of Ordinarmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, for example, some have questioned whether or not the Eleatic Principle is suitable for deciding metaphysical questions about whether tables, rocks, and the like exist, even if it is a suitable criterion for certain empirical existence questions (Thomasson 2008). Others have questioned whether the eliminativist’s demand for a unified principle of composition that could explain why composition occurs in some cases but not others is an appropriate demand at all (Sanford 1993; Lowe 2005; Thomasson 2007). Debates about the existence of ordinary objects have also spurred deeper debates about whether or not parsimony is an appropriate criterion for deciding among ontologies (Thomasson 2007, 151–75).…”

Section: Why Has the Controversy Arisen Now?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects

Thomasson

2010

Philosophy Compass

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The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the ‘obvious’ sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects – including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co‐location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.

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“…Jay Rosenberg (), David Sanford (), and Amie Thomasson (, pp. 130–136) explicitly endorse such an answer to the SCQ.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…For discussion of parthood's transitivity see Rescher, ; Johnston, ; Lowe, , p. 94; Moltmann, and ; Sanford, ; Simons, , p. 11; van Inwagen, , p. 65; and Varzi, .…”

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confidence: 99%

Ordinary Objects and Series‐Style Answers to the Special Composition Question

Silva

2012

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The special composition question asks, roughly, under what conditions composition occurs. The common sense view is that composition only occurs among some things and that all and only ‘ordinary objects’ exist. Peter van Inwagen has marshaled a devastating argument against this view. The common sense view appears to commit one to giving what van Inwagen calls a ‘series‐style answer’ to the special composition question, but van Inwagen argues that series‐style answers are impossible because they are inconsistent with the transitivity of parthood. In what follows I answer this objection in addition to other, less troubling objections raised by van Inwagen.

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The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology

Cited by 54 publications

References 7 publications

Part and Whole, Again1

Part and Whole, Again1

The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects

Ordinary Objects and Series‐Style Answers to the Special Composition Question

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