The Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge

Abstract

-3-86838-126-9 2011 No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use of the purchaser of the work Printed on acid-free paper FSC-certified (Forest Stewardship Council) Notes on Contributers| 11 Background and Divergent Sources of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) KnowledgeIt is no exaggeration to claim that it was above all twentieth century work in the philosophy of science and the sociology of (scientific) knowledge that set the scene for a flourishing of relativist (and constructivist) claims. To be sure, cognitive relativism is by no means a new doctrine. Rather, it is one of the oldest topics in philosophy. Since Plato presented his arguments against Protagoras' claim that man is the measure of all things in the Theaetetus, the discussion of relativist doctrines gave rise to fruitful and heated argument. However, by and large in the history of philosophy cognitive relativists are hard to find.This situation changed dramatically in the last century. Of course, just as in the case of the early sophists there are sociological and historical explanations for this rise of relativist thought in certain quarters -so there are good sociological and historical explanations for the refusal of relativist thought in other quarters. 1 But there is also a philosophical explanation for this change -an explanation by the changes of thought in epistemology and the philosophy of science itself.In the middle of the last century by now classical figures in philosophy 1 This should be -and is -also accepted by those very critical of relativist sociology of knowledge. Thus, e. g., Richard Fumerton, who argues for a return to a traditional form of foundationalism, rhetorically asks: "I am a confirmed foundationalist and I studied at Brown -just a coincidence?" (Fumerton 2010, p. 103). Introduction richard schantz and markus seidel12 | richard schantz and markus seidel with quite disparate background proposed ideas that might seem to promote relativist theses: Willard van Orman Quine, Thomas S. Kuhn and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Thus, Quine in his masterpiece Two Dogmas of Empiricism attacked the radical empiricist doctrine of reductionism, according to which scientific discourse can be defined in terms of observation and logico-mathematical auxiliaries by claiming that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body" 2 . This confirmational holism gives rise to his famous thesis of the underdetermination of theory by the data that has been used hitherto prominently in relativist argumentation. If, as Quine maintains, "any statement can be held true come what may" 3 , then -so many relativists argue -which one in fact ...