The Problem of Political Obligation

Democratic Authority and the Boundary Problem

“…in contemporary nation‐states will suffice as well to define normative divisions. If, however, it is enough for associative normativity that others in society “start to act” as if there is a common enterprise (Mokrosinska , 154), this seems consistent with the over‐inclusiveness (due to the entailed acceptance of clearly illegitimate political subjection) with which I charge Kantian political philosophy in the following sections.…”

“…As Dorota Mokrosinska points out (and as I conceded from the start), the particularity requirement, taken strictly, “does not exclude the possibility that we might have political obligations to more states than just one” (Mokrosinska , 172). We might have special, particularized relationships with multiple states, just as we can have special moral relationships with multiple persons or more than one “home.” So there might be more than one state that was naturally identified as a person's “own.” But unless we accept the possibility of conflicting moral obligations, we could not have obligations of full allegiance (which would include requirements to “serve when called” and otherwise fully participate in and specially support a particular state) that were owed to multiple states.…”

“…Stilz and Mokrosinska both appear to appeal to broadly associativist considerations in order to try to more fully particularize the (natural duty‐based) political obligations they describe, appealing to the many other ways in which people “act together” (Stilz , 175–91) and to the internal normativity of analogous relationships like friendship (Mokrosinska , 146, 160, 231–2). But it is unclear how associative ties can aid the Kantian argument on this point.…”

“…See Arthur Ripstein's discussion of Kant's argument concerning the “three defects in the state of nature,” in Ripstein , 145–81. See also Mokrosinska , 152–4.…”