There is a "crisis" in the "psychology of religion" (Belzen 2010, 9) that is partially explained by a persisting disinclination to "separate itself" from theology and the religious or nonreligious commitments of its theorists (Beit-Hallahmi 1974, 87). Related to this is the vigorously contested and controversial status and meanings associated with the concept of a transcendent reality. More than any other single category in the study of religion, there is no agreement on how to conceptualize or define this slippery and amorphous concept. For example, should it be understood in terms of a supernatural/superhuman god or gods (e.g., Spiro 1966), or a cosmic sacred (e.g., Eliade 1959) entity or force? There is neither consensus on the theoretical weight that the cat-egory bears (or ought to) in definitions of religion nor is there resolution of the controversies associated with which interpretive stance-emic or etic-should prevail.In this respect, "psychology of religion" is caught up in similar long-standing debates of self-definition that continue to plague its cognate discipline, the study of religion. The very term, religion, remains saturated in controversy that the psychology of religion cannot afford to ignore. In similar fashion to the study of religion, the question must also be asked, what kind of "psychology" is most appropriate to inform and frame the psychology of religion? 1 Perhaps the most critical set of theoretical issues here lie in the complex problems involved in linking "psychology" and "religion" and the theoretical complications that entail in settling on any particular formulation, such as "psychology of religion," "psychology and religion," or "psychology as religion" (Wulff 1991; Jonte-Pace and Parsons 2001). Before remarking further on these formulations with respect to the authors discussed here, I will introduce another approach that promises a greater degree of explanatory clarity and conceptual depth that rests upon a different set of theoretical assumptions and critical methodology: the psychoanalytic study of religion (Hewitt 2014) initiated by Freud.The books under discussion here, while richly varied in the topics they address-such as spirituality, comparative mysticism, the role of the guru/mystic therapist in clinical practice, the nature and location of the unconscious, consciousness and paranormal experiences-are however remarkably uniform in rejecting Freud's psychoanalytic study of religion. 2 This stance is puzzling especially as Grotstein, Kakar, and Parsons in particular insist on retaining some versions of psychoanalysis in the elaboration of their respective psychology of religion program(s). They all insist however that psychoanalysis is useful on condition that religious beliefs and experiences are not pathologized. Here, "pathology" seems to be synonymous with the so-called "reductive" explanations of religious beliefs and experiences that regard them strictly as products of the human mind. They reject a psychoanalysis that refuses to validate transcendence or the ...