The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings

Deemen, Adrian Van

doi:10.1007/s003550050138

Cited by 56 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Exceptions to this have dealt with the probability that there is a Condorcet winner when indifference is allowed [Van Deemen (1999), Lepelley and Martin (1998), Fishburn and Gehrlein (1980), Jones, Radcliff, Taber and Timpone (1995)]. The purpose of the current study is to consider the impact that voter indifference on candidates will have on the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

Gehrlein¹,

Valognes²

2001

Social Choice and Welfare

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The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR's) on three candidates for large electorates when voter indifference between candidates is allowed. It is shown that increasing the proportion of voters who have partial indifference will increase the probability that a Condorcet winner exists, and will also increase the Condorcet efficiency of all WSR's. The same observation is observed when the proportion of voters with complete preferences on candidates is reduced. Borda Rule is shown to be the WSR with maximum Condorcet efficiency over a broad range of assumptions related to voter preferences. The result of forcing voters to completely rank all candidates, by randomly breaking ties on candidates that are viewed as indifferent, leads to a reduction in the probability that a Condorcet winner exists and to a reduction in the Condorcet efficiency of all WSR's.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

Gehrlein¹,

Valognes²

2001

Social Choice and Welfare

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“…Recasting the issue within a behavioral approach to social choice theory shows that worries about cycling almost entirely disappear (Regenwetter et al, 2006; also see Van Deeman, 1999; and on behavioral social choice Comparative Political Studies 45(9) more broadly, see Adams, Merrill, & Grofman, 2005). In particular, because elections are conducted within fixed institutional arrangements and because electoral agendas are not open but limited to a small number of viable parties and because voter preferences over the parties are inconsistent with the assumption of an impartial culture, the pessimism of pure theory about cycling is almost always unfounded in its application to actual elections.…”

Section: Are There Electoral Majorities?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Majorities, Political Parties, and Collective Representation

McDonald

Budge

Best

2012

Comparative Political Studies

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In practice, democracies privilege plurality parties. Theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice. Abstract social choice theory wonders whether an electoral majority even exists. A more optimistic line of argument, prominent in research on collective representation, assumes that the policy position of the median voter embodies the majority electoral preference. The conflict between what democracies actually do and what two leading theories of the democratic process say calls for a comparative inquiry into electoral majoritarianism. For each of a dozen countries, the authors ask whether any political party commands a predominant majoritarian position among voters—that is, is a Condorcet winner—and, if so, which party it is. They find that a Condorcet winning party exists in all 12 countries and that the plurality party can lay more claim to representing the popular majority than the left—right median party. These findings have important implications for the study of democratic representation, which the authors consider in their conclusions.

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“…Notice the accompaniment of strategic opportunities with cycles (for either the sincere or strategic profile); as I show a bit later, for election procedures based on pairwise rankings, cycles always accompany actions and the other voting peculiarities. An interesting corollary of this fact is that if the assertion made by many authors (e.g., Van Deemen, 1999;Tangian, 2000) that it is unlikely for cyclic outcomes to occur in practice is accurate, then their claim also means that strategic voting and the other election oddities should not be expected.…”

Section: Other Agenda Winnersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unsettling aspects of voting theory

Saari

2003

Economic Theory

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Voting procedures are known to be plagued with a variety of difficulties such as strategic voting, or where a voter is rewarded with a better election outcome by not voting, or where a winning candidate can lose by receiving more support. Once we know that these problems can occur, the next objective should be to completely understand how, why, and where they arise. Namely, for each election procedure, the new goal is to determine when such problems can occur, all voter types who can cause these difficulties, and the actions they must take. This paper develops an easily used approach to handle all of these issues for standard voting methods. New intuitive explanations for these various oddities follow from this approach. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases: Strategic voting, Monotonicity, Voting paradoxes, No-show paradox, Positional voting., JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D71.,

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The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings

Cited by 56 publications

References 0 publications

Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

Electoral Majorities, Political Parties, and Collective Representation

Unsettling aspects of voting theory

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