The Principal-Agent Model and Regulatory Federalism

Hedge, David M.; Sgicchitano, Michael J.; Metz, Patricia

doi:10.1177/106591299104400414

Cited by 29 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Since these relations and the related mechanisms of control have been discussed in numerous studies, including two previous studies of the IRS Wood 1998, 1999), I note only briefly the findings that have structured my empirical model. The literature mainly finds that bureaucratic agencies are responsive to the preferences of presidents (Moe 1985;Moe 1987;Olson 1995;Sabatier, Loomis, and McCarthy 1995;Scholz and Wood 1998;Wood 1990;Waterman 1991, 1993) and0or Congress (Calvert, Moran, and Weingast 1987;Carpenter 1996;Chubb 1983;Hansen 1990;Olson 1995Olson , 1996Weingast and Moran 1983;Wood 1992) and even state-level politicians despite the lack of formal authority of state politicians over federal agencies (Hedge, Scicchitano, and Metz 1991;Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991;Scholz and Wei 1986;Wood 1992).…”

Section: Modeling Bureaucratic Behavior: Irs Auditsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS

Mete

2002

The Journal of Politics

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This article extends the empirical literature on bureaucratic behavior by modeling the strategic interactions between an enforcement agency, its clients, and its political principals. Specifically, the study focuses on the joint analysis of IRS enforcement decisions and taxpayer compliance behavior in order to fully explore the extent of political controls over the agency. The results suggest that there is a very strong reciprocal relationship between IRS audit levels and taxpayer compliance levels across states and over time and that taxpayer compliance behavior is also influenced by partisan changes in national politics.Over a hundred published empirical studies of bureaucracy in the past two decades have demonstrated that bureaucratic outputs of many agencies are responsive to the political principals that oversee their activities. There is, however, a common weakness in the design of most of these studies that can potentially undermine our confidence in what should otherwise be a reasonably established hypothesis. By focusing exclusively on the political-bureaucratic interaction, the principal-agent model implicit in most studies ignores potential strategic interactions between clients and bureaucracy and between clients and political actors.Consider Olson's (1999) finding in which regulated entities in the affected industry change their compliance strategies because of signals of support from congressional hearings. In order to faithfully execute the existing laws, we would expect the Food and Drug Administration ( FDA) to respond to increased noncompliance by stepping up enforcement efforts among the relevant industrial sectors. However, studies that omit the strategic interactions between clients and bureaucracy and between clients and political actors could conclude that

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Section: Modeling Bureaucratic Behavior: Irs Auditsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS

Mete

2002

The Journal of Politics

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“…Stein's study (1984) showed that there was a delay in the impact of federal policies as municipalities would wait to see if federal funds would continue, and Wood (1991) found federalism to dampen the policy responsiveness of the states. While federal regulators were able to shape the behavior of state officials, these federal bureaucrats were not responsive to national political principals (Hedge, Scicchitano, and Metz 1991). On the other hand, the states emerged in a more favorable light.…”

Section: Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The State of State Politics Research

Brace

Jewett

1995

Political Research Quarterly

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Reviewers of the state of state politics research often lament the field's lack of theoretical progress and its fragmented character These conditions persist yet a review of this research published in the professions top journals over the past decade reveals a substantively rich and often methodologically sophisticated body of scholarship. Applying an inclusive approach, this essay examines all research published on state politics over the last decade in the profession's six top journals: APSR, AJPS, JOP, PRQ Polity and SSQ. Trends in substantive focus and the findings of this research are described, as are methodological approaches and innovations. The study takes stock of the progress the field has made and identifies promising avenues for future inquiry. The subfield could advance by emphasizing its unique comparative analytical advantages. These advantages provide an excellent opportunity to evaluate the impact of institutional and environmental contexts on political behavior, processes and outcomes. The field needs to emphasize the importance of modeling political behavior across contexts, and interactively across contextual and individual levels of analysis. By so doing, the subfield can show how states matter and also assess the generality of models that focus too often on behavior or process within single contexts.Reviews of the state politics subfield typically deplore the field's lack of progress and complain about the disunity in approaches and subject matter that characterize the field's research. On one level, this review departs from that tradition. Studies appearing in the professioris top journals make clear that there has been notable progress in the study of state politics over the past decade. Those laboring in the field have contributed to knowledge about state politics including the interplay of states within a national setting, the effects NOTE: Aubrey Jewett provided enormous assistance in compiling the bibliography used in this essay. His diligent and extraordinary efforts were instrumental in the completion of this study. The study benefited as well from the thoughtful input of John Geer and the anonymous reviewers he selected.

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“…This discussion differs from recent work on regulatory policy design and implementation in several important respects. Much of the recent research has focused on explaining regulatory enforcement at the street level as mediated by such factors as values and attitudes of regulatory agents [Hedge, Menzel, and Krause, 1989;Hedge, Menzel, and Williams, 1988;Shover et al, 19841, and political and economic pressures [Hedge, Scicchitano, and Metz, 1991;Scholz, 1991;Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick, 1991;Scholz and Wei, 1986;Thompson and Scicchitano, 1985;Wood, 19921. In contrast, my emphasis is the top of the implementation chain, in looking at the ways in which various features of state mandates facilitate relevant state agencies' implementation actions. While much of the implementation literature has shifted its attention to the bottom of the implementation chain in studying factors affecting target-group actions [see Palumbo and Calista, 19901, there is still a need for more systematic investigation of presumptions about the ways in which policy design shapes implementation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mandate Design and Implementation: Enhancing Implementation Efforts and Shaping Regulatory Styles

May¹

1993

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

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This research addresses the influence of mandate design upon implementation efforts and regulatory styles. Empirical analyses of these relationships are conducted for state‐level land‐use and development‐management mandates enacted by California, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington. Three key findings provide insights about the role of mandate design in facilitating policy implementation. First, implementation efforts are more easily influenced than regulatory styles. Second, it is more difficult to foster conciliatory regulatory styles than it is to foster more legalistic styles. Third, a high degree of statutory coherence is not a necessary condition for strong implementation efforts. More generally, the findings show that policy designers can enhance implementation efforts and shape regulatory styles by altering key mandate features.

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The Principal-Agent Model and Regulatory Federalism

Cited by 29 publications

References 21 publications

Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS

Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS

The State of State Politics Research

Mandate Design and Implementation: Enhancing Implementation Efforts and Shaping Regulatory Styles

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