The primacy of generalities in hypothetical reasoning

Revlis, Russell; Hayes, John R.

doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90008-4

Cited by 21 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In the present study, participants have been asked to revise beliefs that are based on prior experience of an integrated knowledge structure. This is consistent with early studies of belief revision with adults, in which the knowledge structure was based on definitional relations available to all participants (e.g., Redding-Stewart & Revlin, 1978;Revlis, 1974;Revlis & Hayes, 1972). Revision of integrated and believable materials produces the pattern of results we have reported here.…”

Section: Mental Modelssupporting

confidence: 91%

“…Logically, both the generalist and the particularist solutions are equally correct. Nonetheless, in paper-and-pencil versions of these belief contravening problems (where problems looked just as those above and are presented in a booklet format) college students reliably prefer the generalist solution (Revlin et al, 2005;Revlin, Calvillo, & Mautone 2003;Revlin et al, 2001;Revlis, 1974;Revlis & Hayes, 1972). Their generalist preference is more pronounced for MT than for MP problems (Revlin et al, 2003;.…”

Section: Belief Revision Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The source of the beliefs has an effect on the reasoners' commitment to them (Dieussaert et al, 2000;Politzer & Carles, 2001 Revlis & Hayes, 1972). However, when propositions are integrated in a narrative structure, students treat them in the same way as real, law-like beliefs, and of natural semantic categories (Revlin et al, 2005).…”

Section: Belief Revision Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, when confronted with a counterfactual assumption as in the MT problem above, the general premise will be preserved and the particular premise rejected. In the case of MP problems, however, the counterfactual assumption directly contradicts the generality, which reduces its modal status (degree of necessity), and causes it to be treated by the reasoner as an accidental, arbitrary generalisation (Goodman, 1947;Revlis & Hayes, 1972;Ryle, 1949) -more equivalent to the particular statement. Therefore, reasoners show less of a preference for the generalist solution in MP problems.…”

Section: Adult Counterfactual Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Development of Counterfactual Reasoning in Belief Revision

Hoeck

Revlin²,

Dieussaert³

et al. 2012

PSYCHOL BELG

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The present study examines how children revise beliefs in the face of a new piece of information that they must accept as true and under what circumstances their belief-revision processes differ from college-aged adults. Results suggest that overall, 7-year-old children (children at Stage 2 reasoning; Moshman, 1990) revise beliefs as do adults, by rejecting particular beliefs in favour of more general ones. However, only adults adjust their revision strategy as a consequence of the logical structure of the initial belief set. Adults, but not children, tend to organise their revised beliefs to be consistent with general statements more often when the set of beliefs create a Modus Tollens logic structure than when they create a Modus Ponens structure. This difference in belief revision by the two age groups reflects their sensitivity to logical structure.

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Section: Mental Modelssupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Belief Revision Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Belief Revision Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Adult Counterfactual Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Development of Counterfactual Reasoning in Belief Revision

Hoeck

Revlin²,

Dieussaert³

et al. 2012

PSYCHOL BELG

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“…Current studies of prevarication have demonstrated the operation of specific inference processes in conjectural reasoning (Revlis & Hayes, 1972;Revlis, Lipkin, & Hayes, 1971): When people reason from false assumptions, they exhibit consistent strategies in the assignment of truth values to propositions. These strategies appear to be independent of the superficial form of the propositions and suggest that the reasoner is attending to deeper aspects of the problems.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Prevarication: Reasoning from false assumptions

Revlis

1974

Memory & Cognition

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This paper examines the strategies used in solving prevaricative reasoning problems. The task consisted of a noncontradictory set of propositions followed by an assumption that introduced an inconsistency. Ss were required to restore consistency by assigning truth values to propositions. When reasoning from false assumptions, Ss exhibit a specific strategy in assigning truth values: If forced to choose between the truth of a generality (e.g., All As are Bs) and that of a particuIar fact (e.g., This Y is a Z), the Ss assign the generaIity TRUE and the fact FALSE. Affirmative generaIities are assigned TRUE more often than are negative ones, and those expressing class inclusion are assigned TRUE more often than those expressing property assignment. The data show that the selection of a "path" through this hypotheticaI reasoning problem cannot be attributed to either the syntactic form or the preexperimentaI credibiIity of the propositions. A generality coding model was discussed in terms of strategies shown in prevaricative reasoning problems as weil as in other inference tasks.

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Reasoning

Rips

2002

Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology

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Some current theories portray human reasoning as the result of a single cognitive process that operates in a uniform way across all domains of knowledge. This unitary process handles both entailments (given information guarantees the conclusion) and inductively strong inferences (given information makes the conclusion more likely). Other theories partition reasoning into two or more types that differ according to the domain of knowledge to which they apply, the kind of inference (entailment vs. inductively strong inference) they implement, or other psychological properties (rule‐based vs. similarity‐based, explicit vs. implicit, analytic vs. holistic, decontextual vs. context‐bound, and so on). This chapter surveys both unitary and partitioning theories, as well as the experimental evidence that supports them. Unitary theories run into difficulties with simple inferences that people endorse but the favored method doesn't explain. Partitioning theories gain from flexibility, but often fail to distinguish their component processes in an adequate way. In some cases, evidence for multiple processes may be due instead to multiple knowledge sources; in others, the processes are described too vaguely to do serious psychological work.

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The primacy of generalities in hypothetical reasoning

Cited by 21 publications

References 18 publications

The Development of Counterfactual Reasoning in Belief Revision

The Development of Counterfactual Reasoning in Belief Revision

Prevarication: Reasoning from false assumptions

Reasoning

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