The Presentist’s Dilemma

Meyer, Ulrich

doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1784-9

Cited by 81 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Dorato 2006;Lombard 1999Lombard , 2010Meyer 2005Meyer , 2013Savitt 2006). The controversy is best described as concerning the status of the 'is' in standard characterisations of presentism, such as:…”

Section: The Triviality Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This type of response against the triviality objection has, however, been condemned as ineffective by Meyer (2005). Meyer complains that this merely restricts the validity of existential generalisation-the inference from the fact that a particular x is F to something (in general) being F-to names whose referent is present, and that this is just to slip back into a tensed interpretation of the existential 'is'.…”

Section: Crisp Attempts To Defend a Detensed Interpretation [Interprementioning

confidence: 99%

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A foundation for presentism

Pezet

2016

Synthese

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Presentism states that everything is present. Crucial to our understanding of this thesis is how we interpret the 'is'. Recently, several philosophers have claimed that on any interpretation presentism comes out as either trivially true or manifestly false. Yet, presentism is meant to be a substantive and interesting thesis. I outline in detail the nature of the problem and the standard interpretative options. After unfavourably assessing several popular responses in the literature, I offer an alternative interpretation that provides the desired result. This interpretation is then used to clarify the distinction between 'real change' from mere variation and temporal relativisation. Reflecting on my solution, I try to diagnose the source of confusion over these issues. Then, building upon Fine's (Modality and tense, 2005) distinction between ontic and factive presentism, I elucidate what the presentist thesis specifically concerns and how best to formalise it. In the process I distinguish a weak and strong (extended) version of the presentist thesis. Finally, I end by drawing out some limitations of the paper.

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Section: The Triviality Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Crisp Attempts To Defend a Detensed Interpretation [Interprementioning

confidence: 99%

A foundation for presentism

Pezet

2016

Synthese

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“…27 Cf. Williams 1996, Meyer 2005and Savitt 2006 You were born after the French revolution, not because of some intrinsic feature of either the revolution or your birth, or of the times at which these events occurred, or of some relation induced by the order which the series instantiates. It was the marching present, which at some point enlightened the revolution (pun not intended), when your birth was still future, which grounds the fact that your birth occurred later than the revolution.…”

Section: The A- the B-and The R-theory Of Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Trends in the Philosophy of Time: an Introduction to Time and Reality I

Boccardi

2016

Manuscrito

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This essay is an introduction to Time and Reality I, the first part of a special issue dedicated to the philosophy of time. Here I outline a number of new trends in philosophical theorizing about time, detailing how the various contributions fit into the picture. I argue that there has been a potentially misleading tendency to separate the debate over the passage of time from the debate over the reality of tense. This has obscured a number of interesting philosophical questions. One of the aims of this volume is to bring these two issues together, where they belong. I argue that many contributions to it go in the right direction. The contributions to this volume also establish uncharted philosophical junctures between Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Morality, and the Philosophy of Mind.

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“…I believe that there are independent arguments that this choice is at best a path into a hopeless dialectic (Dolev, 2007) or at worst embracing an illusion (Meyer (2005), Savitt (2006)). What I suggest instead is that one abandon Realism and the complexities it brings in its train.…”

Section: Manuscritomentioning

confidence: 99%

Kit Fine on Tense and Reality

Savitt

2016

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Kit Fine (2005 recently described and defended a novel position in the philosophy of time, fragmentalism. It is not often that a new (and even perhaps a radically new) option appears in this old field, and for that reason alone these two essays merit serious attention. I will try to present briefly but fairly some of the considerations that Fine thinks favour fragmentalism. I will also weigh the merits of fragmentalism against the view that Fine presents as its chief rival, relativism, as well as the merits of both against the view that he calls antirealism. Along the way, we should pick up a clearer picture of fragmentalism itself.

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The Presentist’s Dilemma

Cited by 81 publications

References 13 publications

A foundation for presentism

A foundation for presentism

Recent Trends in the Philosophy of Time: an Introduction to Time and Reality I

Kit Fine on Tense and Reality

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