The Predictability of Punitive Damages

Eisenberg, Theodore; Goerdt, John; Ostrom, Brian J.; Rottman, David B.; Wells, Martin T.

doi:10.1086/468010

Cited by 91 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…957-62). 1997Vidmar and Rose 2001), with a rate of about 3-5 percent of plaintiff trial wins (see, for example, Eisenberg et al 2006, p. 268), and to be more likely to be awarded in cases of intentional misbehavior (Eisenberg et al 1997;Moller 1996). Evidence also suggests that judges and juries award punitive damages at about the same rate (Eisenberg et al 2006) and that punitive awards are more frequent in cases of financial injury than in cases of personal injury (Moller, Pace, and Carroll 1999).…”

Section: Prior Empirical Literature On Punitive Damages and Securitiementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Evidence also suggests that judges and juries award punitive damages at about the same rate (Eisenberg et al 2006) and that punitive awards are more frequent in cases of financial injury than in cases of personal injury (Moller, Pace, and Carroll 1999). 6 Geographical variation in award patterns has been observed (Eisenberg et al 1997).…”

Section: Prior Empirical Literature On Punitive Damages and Securitiementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Choi¹,

Eisenberg²

2010

The Journal of Legal Studies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article provides the first empirical analysis of punitive damages in securities arbitrations.Using a data set of over 6,800 securities arbitration awards, we find that claimants prevailed in 48.9 percent of arbitrations and that 9.1 percent of those claimant victories included a punitive damages award. The existence of a punitive damages award was associated with claims that suggested egregious misbehavior and with claims that provided higher compensatory awards. The pattern of punitive awards is more consistent with a traditional view of punitive damages that incorporates a retributive component than with a law and economics emphasis on efficient deterrence. We also report evidence that the relation between punitive and compensatory awards did not differ substantially between the securities arbitrators' data and data on juries available from periodic Civil Justice Surveys by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

show abstract

Section: Prior Empirical Literature On Punitive Damages and Securitiementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Prior Empirical Literature On Punitive Damages and Securitiementioning

confidence: 99%

Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Choi¹,

Eisenberg²

2010

The Journal of Legal Studies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Second, because our sample focuses on the nation's largest counties and state courts of general jurisdiction, the data might not convey those aspects of the civil justice system, if any, that are peculiar to smaller counties or rural areas or to cases heard in special-jurisdiction courts (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1989;Eisenberg et al 1997;Heise 2000). Third, the focus on state courts precludes generating implications for federal courts.…”

Section: Data Methodology and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal

Eisenberg

Heise²

2008

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Prior federal civil appellate studies show that appeals courts overturn jury verdicts more than bench decisions and that defendants fare better than plaintiffs on appeal. Attitudinal and selection effect hypotheses may explain the appellate court tilt favoring defendants. This study presents the first statistical models of the appeals process for a comprehensive set of state court civil trials to test theories on appellate outcomes. Using data from 46 large counties on 8,038 trials and 549 concluded appeals, we find that appellate reversal rates for jury trials and defendant appeals exceed reversal rates for bench trials and plaintiff appeals. The reversal rate for plaintiff appeals is 21.5 percent, compared with 41.5 percent for defendant appeals.The reversal rate for jury trials is 33.7 percent, compared with 27.5 percent for bench trials.Descriptive analyses and more formal models suggest that appellate judges' attitudes toward trial-level adjudicators help explain these asymmetric outcomes.

show abstract

“…Using the Civil Justice Survey datasets, Eisenberg and collaborators provide evidence suggesting that the size of punitive awards is strongly correlated with the size of compensatory damages; moreover, this relationship has been relatively stable over time (from 1991-2005, the lifespan of the datasets) (Eisenberg & Heise, 2011: 20 tbl.4 (2005; Eisenberg et al, 1997Eisenberg et al, : 648 tbl.5 (1992; Eisenberg et al, 2002Eisenberg et al, : 747-8 (1996; Eisenberg et al, : 281-2 tbls. 4, 5 (1992Eisenberg et al, -2001).…”

Section: Predictability: Relationship To Compensatory Damagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic analysis of punitive damages: Theory, empirics, and doctrine

Sharkey¹

2013

Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Predictability of Punitive Damages

Cited by 91 publications

References 0 publications

Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal

Economic analysis of punitive damages: Theory, empirics, and doctrine

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About