1984
DOI: 10.2307/1372401
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The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument

Abstract: Adherents to the Law and Economics Approach (LEA)

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Cited by 2 publications
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“…Platforms often use "blanket" measures to obtain information and employ precision marketing to trap consumers in an information cocoon. These practices contribute to the formation of a digital divide, [10] as platforms refuse to disclose the process of using Algorithmic technology citing "trade secret" reasons. Furthermore, the platform market exhibits a significantly concentrated market ISSN 2616-5902 Vol.…”
Section: Causes Of Price Discrimination By Big Data Platformsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Platforms often use "blanket" measures to obtain information and employ precision marketing to trap consumers in an information cocoon. These practices contribute to the formation of a digital divide, [10] as platforms refuse to disclose the process of using Algorithmic technology citing "trade secret" reasons. Furthermore, the platform market exhibits a significantly concentrated market ISSN 2616-5902 Vol.…”
Section: Causes Of Price Discrimination By Big Data Platformsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the principal debate has been between a political/faimess and an efficiency/consumer-welfare model of antitrust policy (White 1991;Jacobs 1995), other more eclectic voices have been heard as well.2 For example, scholars who accept the need to apply the antitrust laws in economic terms contest that the Chicago school applies the correct insights or reaches the correct results in terms of enforcement policy (Areeda and Turner 1978, Q 105;Baker 1989;Krattemaker and Salop 1986).' In a different vein, Peritz, in his earlier work, describes the dynamics of this early period of antitrust law as an ongoing struggle between a competition based logic and a property based logic of the Sherman Act that continues even today (Peritz 1996(Peritz , 1994(Peritz , 1990a(Peritz , 1990b(Peritz , 1989a(Peritz , 1989b(Peritz , 1984Sklar 1990).…”
Section: Postmodern Antitrust Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%