2019
DOI: 10.1093/jeg/lbz030
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The powers of a social auditor in a global production network: the case of Verité and the exposure of forced labour in the electronics industry

Abstract: Research on labour governance actors in global production networks (GPNs) has been limited to civil society organisations, firms and governments. Understanding the influence of actors in GPNs has been dealt with singular and overt modes of relational power. This paper contributes to both debates by examining an intermediary actor—the social auditing organisation Verité—and its exercise of multiple modes of overt and covert powers to illustrate the complex terrain of change in GPNs. Verité, whose exposure of fo… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Labour rights violations and poor working conditions are common challenges in many GPN industries. Governance measures to improve the situation are dominated by private and voluntary self‐governance, such as codes of conduct and audits, which often fail to systematically or sustainably improve working conditions (Lund‐Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014; Raj‐Reichert, 2019). SRPP in the EU can be a unique public labour governance instrument for GPNs in three ways.…”
Section: Srpp As a Labour Governance Instrument In Gpnsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Labour rights violations and poor working conditions are common challenges in many GPN industries. Governance measures to improve the situation are dominated by private and voluntary self‐governance, such as codes of conduct and audits, which often fail to systematically or sustainably improve working conditions (Lund‐Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014; Raj‐Reichert, 2019). SRPP in the EU can be a unique public labour governance instrument for GPNs in three ways.…”
Section: Srpp As a Labour Governance Instrument In Gpnsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whereas in the further evolution of GPN analysis relational approaches played less of a role (Cumbers, 2015: 142), recent debates on relational and networked power in GPN have revived the initial notion of GPNs as networks of processual relationships (see e.g. Arnold and Hess, 2017;Raj-Reichert, 2020). By conceptualizing LCRs and GPNs as emerging from networked practice relationships of different territorial extent, the here developed practice ontology provides further grounds for a refreshed engagement of GPN analysis with relational thinking.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third and last, the here developed practice ontology approach to LCRs in GPNs can contribute to an enhanced understanding of "the relational, networked and institutional qualities of how power is generated and ultimately exercised" in GPNs (Hess, 2008: 456; see also Arnold and Hess, 2017;Raj-Reichert, 2020). By highlighting how institutionalized frameworks of labor control need to be enacted and (re-)produced through practices to become effective, the analysis has shown that for understanding the power relations structuring GPNs, it is insufficient to map which actors have access to or possess certain power resources (c.f.…”
Section: Practice-complex 2: Union-bustingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, how exactly do standard intermediaries act as ‘go‐betweens’ between different actors, such as lead firms, sustainability standard bodies and farmers and on‐farm workers in the global South? Although Ouma (2010) talks about standard implementation and compliance as ‘situated compromises’ between different actors in GVCs, and Raj‐Reichert (2020) highlights the role of intermediary actors such as auditors in exercising both covert and overt influence in these processes, GVC analysis does not provide clear answers to whether the roles performed by intermediaries in GVCs are potentially conflicting, and whether there is any dark side to standard intermediation in GVCs. For instance, standard intermediaries might become involved in conflicts of interest and serve their own interests at the expense of either sustainability standard setters, managers, or the intended beneficiaries of sustainability standards at the base of GVCs.…”
Section: Gvcs Regulatory Intermediaries and Upscaling Of Sustainability Standardsmentioning
confidence: 99%