The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror Law in the United Nations

Abstract

This research attempts to answer the question: to what extent do institutional procedures matter in shaping international organization policies? Little empirical evidence has been applied to the question, in part because structural forces predominate in most theories and because it is difficult empirically to isolate the procedural variable. The UN’s response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, in the context of its treatment of the terrorism issue generally, allows us to compare and contrast the response of the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. While the case makes it clear that structural forces have influenced the choice of procedures in both bodies over their histories, it is also clear that exogenous shocks and the search for creative policies by major powers can cause dramatic shifts in institutional procedures. In particular, the events of 11 September created a unique opening for the United States and other Western powers to attempt a radical revision of anti-terror law. This could be done most efficiently through the Security Council by use of procedural provisions that were either dormant or only recently revitalized. Efforts to cement a consensus in the GA Sixth Committee quickly ran aground against age-old questions of the definition and scope of terrorism against the backdrop of norms on occupation and self-determination. The research should rekindle interest in procedural issues and the problem of ‘forum shopping’.

Action or inaction: United Nations Security Council activity, 1994–2013

“…Procedures and process matter in international organizations (Stiles, 2006;Koremenos et al, 2001). Nearly all international organizations have both formal and informal procedures to accommodate the needs of both weak and strong states (Stone, 2011).…”

State agency in the time of the global war on terror: India and the counter-terrorism regime

“…Since the adoption of SC 1373, however, some states perceive this comprehensive convention as redundant. 61 Polly Nayak predicts that New Delhi's preference for multilateral over bilateral cooperative agreements will incline it to work through the UN and various Asian counterterrorism groups. 62 While multilateral efforts help India consolidate its identity in the global counter-terrorism regime, at the regional level India practises selective multilateralism.…”

Compliance with International Law

“…Some states, such as Iran, have expressed disdain for the CTC and resisted implementing the resolution, consistent with their overall posture on the issue. These are the same states that have effectively blocked the completion of a comprehensive convention against terrorism for the past eight years (Stiles, 2006).…”

“…This is also consistent with the overall context of the resolution, since it emerged from the 11 September attacks. During this period, there was considerable effort on the part of almost all states to strengthen international commitments to fighting terror through the Security Council, the General Assembly Sixth Committee and a variety of specialized agencies and regional organizations (Stiles, 2006). While this was clearly not limited to states that had suffered a terror attack, it was led by Western states that had previously been victimized (including the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France and Germany -although the latter two states have yet to implement several provisions of 1373).…”