The Power of Policy and the Entrenchment of Inequalities in Ethiopia: Reframing Agency in the Global Land Rush

Why foreign agricultural investment fails? Five lessons from Ethiopia

“…The second phase occurred between 2001 and 2007 during which time changes in agricultural and FDI policies enabled new foreign investments in agriculture. The third phase, beginning in 2007, was an era of unprecedented land acquisition wherein foreign investors were actively pursuing mega leases of up to 100 000 ha (Dejene & Cochrane, 2021; Rahmato, 2014). This was due partly to the favorable promotive environment for large‐scale land investment (Abbink, 2011; Dejene & Cochrane, 2021; Rahmato, 2011).…”

“…The third phase, beginning in 2007, was an era of unprecedented land acquisition wherein foreign investors were actively pursuing mega leases of up to 100 000 ha (Dejene & Cochrane, 2021; Rahmato, 2014). This was due partly to the favorable promotive environment for large‐scale land investment (Abbink, 2011; Dejene & Cochrane, 2021; Rahmato, 2011). It was not only foreign investors making major acquisitions during this phase, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation was the largest ‘domestic investor’ in SNNPR with at least 175 000 ha allocated for sugar cane cultivation (see Kamski, 2019).…”

“…This phase continued until 2012 when Ethiopia introduced restrictions on land investments with the issuance of the Council of Ministers' Regulation No. 270/2012, which removed some of the benefit provisions and imposed export restrictions (Dejene & Cochrane, 2021). This was followed in 2013 by land allocation limitations for investors (of 5000 ha) and a shift of focus from foreign to domestic investors (Dejene & Cochrane, 2021).…”

Understanding Land Deals in Limbo in Africa: A Focus on Actors, Processes, and Relationships

“…Yet, all of this discursive work can be difficult for companies to sustain. Investors also face the persistent risk of host governments arbitrarily revoking their land titles or cancelling projects, as evidenced in Mozambique, Madagascar, Senegal, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, among others (Nhantumbo & Salomão 2010;Burnod et al 2013;Gagné 2019;Chung 2020;Dejene & Cochrane 2021).…”

Corporate Repertoires of Control and Performances of Power in a Contested Land Deal in Senegal

“…Multiparty democracies with a relatively strong civil society, such as Senegal, may be more responsive to resistance movements that challenge land deals and, by the same token, their electoral legitimacy (Gagné 2019). However, African states with authoritarian tendencies such as Tanzania, Cameroon, and Ethiopia have also recently severely criticized inefficient investors or terminated unproductive land projects (Chung 2020;GRAIN 2018;Dejene & Cochrane 2021). Wherever they operate, companies must therefore actively cultivate state support to obtain and retain land.…”