The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation

Lax, David A.; Sebenius, James K.

doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.1985.tb00304.x

Cited by 53 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…One reason for the disparity between expected and observed cultural negotiating styles is that culture is merely one relevant factor in the intercultural negotiation equation. Other potential influences include alternatives to negotiating (Lax & Sibenius, 1986), pressures from constituents (Roloff & Campion, 1987;Turner, 1992), frame of reference (Putnam & Holmer, 1992), planning ability (Roloff & Jordan, 1992), argumentativeness (Keough, 1992;Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989), face concerns (Wilson, 1992), negotiator biases (Neale & Bazerman, 1985), and reciprocity (Putnam & Jones, 1982;Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965). These vari ables may subordinate, override, or interact with the effects of culture, depending on context.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation Styles in Intercultural Communication

Drake

1995

International Journal of Conflict Management

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This project focuses specifically on how intercultural negotiating differences are evidenced communicatively. Evidence suggests that negotiators deal differently with internationals than domestics. Therefore, it is important to move beyond within-culture comparisons as a basis for predicting intercultural negotiation processes. This paper tests empirically the endurance of culturally-associated negotiation styles in intercultural negotiations between Americans and Taiwanese. Results suggest that culture does exert some global effects in face-to-face encounters with cultural outsiders. Other aspects of negotiation are managed locally, so that predicted cultural differences do not emerge in interaction.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation Styles in Intercultural Communication

Drake

1995

International Journal of Conflict Management

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“…aggressive voice) is not statistically significant. However, case examples presented by Lax and Sebenius (1985) provide some anecdotal support for this negative relationship.…”

Section: Available Alternativesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The antecedents of response strategies in strategic alliances

Tjemkes

Furrer

2010

Management Decision

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Purpose -Strategic alliances involve uncertainty, interdependence, and vulnerability, which often create adverse situations. This paper seeks to understand how alliance managers respond to these adverse situations by examining the influence of four exchange variables on response strategies. Design/methodology/approach -A scenario-based experiment provides empirical support for a typology consisting of seven conceptually and empirically distinct response strategies: exit, opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect. Findings -The results indicate that economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, alliance-specific investments, and the availability of attractive alternatives differentially and interactively affect response strategies. Research limitations/implications -The study offers two main contributions to alliance literature. First, the seven response strategies accurately represent reactions that alliance managers use to deal with adverse situations. Second, the study findings validate and extend previous alliance research by highlighting that a comprehensive response strategy typology is necessary to disentangle the effects of the four exchange conditions on response strategy use, which fosters theory development and managers' ability to manage their alliances effectively. Originality/value -The study contributes to the process perspective on strategic alliances by highlighting the various response strategies that alliance managers use to deal with adverse situations and their antecedents.

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“…In the case of EU negotiations, a member state's cost of leaving the organization may either be low because there are alternatives to a negotiated agreement (Lax and Sebenius, 1985). From models of interstate bargaining, we learn that credible threats of either leaving an organization or letting negotiations break down may provide leverage to a negotiator.…”

Section: 'Classical' Explanations For Negotiation Successmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do arguments matter? Argumentation and negotiation success at the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference

Reinhard

Biesenbender

Holzinger

2013

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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It is widely debated in studies of international negotiations why certain negotiators are more successful than others. Institutionalist and rationalist approaches claim that institutions and negotiators' resources largely explain the outcome of negotiations, whereas constructivist approaches stress the importance of shared norms and values. The article asks to what extent the use of normative arguments explains negotiation success in EU treaty negotiations. We apply our approach to the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. We first define normative arguments as justifications for positions that refer to common norms and develop a concept of common values for EU constitutional negotiations. Second, we assess to what degree governments justify their positions by normative arguments using an automated analysis of position papers. Finally, we ask if such justifications increase success in negotiations. The results of our statistical models show that arguing affects negotiation success significantly and positively.

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The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation

Cited by 53 publications

References 3 publications

Negotiation Styles in Intercultural Communication

Negotiation Styles in Intercultural Communication

The antecedents of response strategies in strategic alliances

Do arguments matter? Argumentation and negotiation success at the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference

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