The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve

Conti‐Brown, Peter

doi:10.1515/9781400888412

Cited by 19 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Before his election as 45th President of the United States, he openly criticized the Chair of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, for “keeping the rates artificially low so the economy doesn't go down.” Social media attacks on the Federal Reserve and its Chair, Jerome Powell, similar to the tweet above, continued throughout his presidency. Many viewed these tweets as a threat to the independence of the Federal Reserve and an effort to politicize the work of the Fed for partisan political reasons (Conti‐Brown & Feinstein, 2020).…”

Section: Central Bank Facebook Linkedin Twittermentioning

confidence: 99%

Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter

Masciandaro

Peia

Romelli

2023

Journal of Economic Surveys

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This paper discusses the evolution of central bank communication, focusing on recent efforts by central banks to engage with a wider audience via social media. We document the social media presence of major central banks and discuss how analyzing Twitter content by and about monetary policy makers can inform about the effectiveness of communication in influencing beliefs. We focus on recent techniques employed in analyzing social media content in order to understand how central bank communication affects expectations and, subsequently, behavior in financial markets.

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Section: Central Bank Facebook Linkedin Twittermentioning

confidence: 99%

Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter

Masciandaro

Peia

Romelli

2023

Journal of Economic Surveys

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“…Central banks' capacity is also closely tied to their institutional autonomy and independence, not only from politicians but also from private interest groups (Conti-Brown, 2016). Allowing extensive structural affiliations between banks and other financial firms accordingly expands the central bank's regulated-industry constituency.…”

Section: Institutional Capacity and Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Central Banks, Systemic Risk and Financial Sector Structural Reform

Omarova¹,

Library²

2018

Preprint

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This chapter contribution to an edited volume examines financial sector structural reform as a critical, though largely under-appreciated to date, dimension of central banks’ post-crisis systemic risk prevention agenda. By limiting the range of permissible transactions or organizational affiliations among different types of financial firms, structural reforms alter the fundamental pattern of interconnectedness in the financial system. In that sense, the chapter argues, reforming the institutional structure of the financial industry operates as a deeper form of the currently evolving macroprudential regulation. The chapter identifies three principal models that form a continuum of potential financial sector structural reform choices and applies this conceptual framework to analysis of post-crisis structural reforms in the U.K., EU, and U.S. It further examines how deeply issues of financial industry structure are embedded in central banks’ regulatory and policy agenda and, in light of this connection, discusses potential implications of current structural reforms for central banks’ post-crisis financial stability mandate.

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“…While we agree with the critical attitude of these scholars, we believe skepticism is warranted not just with respect to the monetary policy performance of central banks, but the institution of discretionary monetary policy directed by a central bank itself . Institutional critiques of central banking call for embracing a broader political‐economic paradigm, to question seriously whether central banking as it is currently practiced is capable of achieving its intended goals, especially as they pertain to monetary policy (e.g., Boettke and Smith , ; Conti‐Brown ; Hogan ; Selgin, Lastrapes, and White ). Our analysis of the knowledge problems inherent in conducting monetary policy via a central bank contributes to the literature focused on institutional critique.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Knowledge Problems in Monetary Policy

Salter

Smith

2017

Contemporary Economic Policy

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Many economists hold that monetary policy missteps played a role in causing or prolonging the 2007–2008 financial crisis. In light of the perceived failure of monetary orthodoxy, models are being theoretically refined and empirically recalibrated. Absent from these technical debates is a recognition of the immense knowledge burdens inherent in monetary policy. We argue that Fed authorities do not have the knowledge required to achieve their own monetary objectives, given their inability to approximately measure or predict changes in the demand for money. Finally, we evaluate the ability of free banking to overcome this knowledge problem. (JEL E42, E52, E58, E61, P16)

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The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter

Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter

Central Banks, Systemic Risk and Financial Sector Structural Reform

What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Knowledge Problems in Monetary Policy

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