The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

Bowman, Clark; Hodge, Jonathan; Yu, Ada

doi:10.1007/s11238-013-9383-2

Cited by 14 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Our conclusions are twofold. First, we find out that iterative voting does improve the quality of the outcome, confirming the conclusions of Bowman et al (2014); second, we analyse the way voters vote in presence of nonseparability, both in one-shot and iterative voting scenarios: they tend to vote rationally (in a sense to be defined in the sequel), and to vote optimistically more frequently than pessimistically.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

“…Another solution, which is suggested by Bowman et al (2014), stands out as structurally different than the ones cited above. It consists of an iterative voting protocol that allows voters to revise their votes based on the outcome of previous iterations.…”

Section: Preferences On Combinatorial Domains and Multiple Referendamentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Our model is based on the work of Bowman et al (2014), who devised comprehensive computer simulations to show that a simple iterative voting protocol can be used to help voters get out of multiple election paradoxes. The authors focus on three-issue multiple referenda and select a set of preference profiles in which sincere simultaneous majority voting leads to particularly unsatisfactory results.…”

Section: Iterative Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Designing ways to avoid multiple election paradoxes is known as a very difficult problem (see Section 2 for details). Perhaps the most convincing method we know of (at least in some contexts) is the one suggested by Bowman et al (2014): allowing for iterative voting. They run computer simulations on a number of voting profiles with two and three binary issues giving rise to multiple election paradoxes, giving to the voters the possibility of changing their votes in an iterated process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Grandi¹,

Lang²,

Ozkes³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters' preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter's preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 73%

Section: Preferences On Combinatorial Domains and Multiple Referendamentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Iterative Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Grandi¹,

Lang²,

Ozkes³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There could be other ways of interleaving elicitation and winner determination. A completely different way of proceeding was proposed very recently by Bowman et al (2014), who propose an iterative protocol that allows voters to revise their votes based on the outcomes of previous iterations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting in Combinatorial Domains

Lang¹,

Xia²

2016

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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Voting in Combinatorial Domains Jérôme Lang a and Lirong Xia b 10.1 Motivations and classes of problems This chapter addresses preference aggregation and voting on domains which are the Cartesian product (or sometimes, a subset of the Cartesian product) of finite domain values, each corresponding to an issue, a variable, or an attribute. As seen in other chapters of this handbook, voting rules map a profile (usually, a collection of rankings, see Chapter 1 (Zwicker, 2015)) into an alternative or a set of alternatives. A key question has to do with the structure of the set of alternatives. Sometimes, this set has a simple structure and a small cardinality (e.g., in a presidential election). But in many contexts, it has a complex combinatorial structure. We give here three typical examples:

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Socio-Environmental-Economic Transformations Towards Sustainable Development

Staniškis

2022

World Sustainability Series

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The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Voting in Combinatorial Domains

Socio-Environmental-Economic Transformations Towards Sustainable Development

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