The (potential) impact of Brexit on UK SMEs: regional evidence and public policy implications

Brown, Ross; Liñares-Zegarra, José Manuel; Wilson, John O. S.

doi:10.1080/00343404.2019.1597267

Cited by 44 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(25 reference statements)

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“…Whilst twothirds of the companies interviewed did not perceive Brexit to be a central or strategic problem, it is clear from our findings that certain types of SMEs (i.e. innovators, exporters and growth-oriented) were disproportionately concerned by Brexit, echoing other empirical studies (Brown et al, 2019). Our in-depth interviews strongly confirmed these same firms to be the most detrimentally affected in terms of job losses, reduced exports and lower innovation expenditure.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 67%

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Shocks, uncertainty and regional resilience: The case of Brexit and Scottish SMEs

et al. 2020

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Regional resilience is a topic of growing academic and policymaker interest. This article empirically examines this concept by scrutinising the impact of Brexit on Scottish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Given their crucial importance for the Scottish economy, SMEs are a good ‘unit of analysis’ and a powerful barometer for measuring regional resilience. The research adopted a novel mixed methods approach examining the Longitudinal Small Business Survey together with in-depth interviews with SMEs. It is clear from the survey analysis that certain types of SMEs (i.e. innovators and exporters) were disproportionately fearful of Brexit. This was firmly corroborated by the interview data which found these same firms to be the most detrimentally impacted, manifesting in reductions in employment, exports and innovation. In contrast, the majority of domestically focused, less innovative SMEs were much less concerned and less negatively affected. While a small minority managed to deploy adjustment mechanisms to mitigate these negative effects, overall many firms had major difficulties operationally and strategically coping with this uncertain and turbulent environment. The findings suggest proactive public policies will be needed to help mitigate the difficulties caused by Brexit for certain types of SMEs.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 67%

“…Indeed, some commentators have speculated that Brexit could have ‘dire consequences’ for these small businesses (Cumming and Zahra, 2016: 690). However, to date there has been a paucity of hard empirical evidence on the actual impact of Brexit at a sub-national level (Brown et al., 2019; Los et al., 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shocks, uncertainty and regional resilience: The case of Brexit and Scottish SMEs

et al. 2020

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“…In fact, the first figures on researchers' mobility after Brexit show an exodus of EU researchers based in UK HEIs (Corbett and Gordon 2018). The Brexit vote is also leading to a high level of uncertainty among knowledge-based and internationally oriented SMEs, as a negative impact is expected on capital investment and export plans (Brown et al 2019).…”

Section: Swiss Vote and Brexit Comparedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional barriers to participation in EU framework programs: contrasting the Swiss and UK cases

Cavallaro

Lepori

2020

Scientometrics

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The aim of this study was to examine how institutional barriers arising from policy decisions influence the level of participation of third-party countries in European Framework Programs (EU-FPs). To achieve this, we contrasted the effect of EU funding restrictions following Switzerland’s 2014 reclassification as a “third country” in Horizon 2020, and the political uncertainties resulting from the 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom (UK). We compared the participation patterns of Swiss and UK higher education institutions (HEIs) with control groups of similar European HEIs over time and, complementarily, analyzed changes in the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Our results showed that the Brexit-induced uncertainty had stronger negative effects than the Swiss reclassification, which was, however, characterized by effective EU funding restrictions. In both cases, the negative impact of institutional barriers was stronger for the more central HEIs in EU-FP networks. These results suggest that the effect of institutional barriers is closely linked to consortium building mechanisms, where research collaboration requires stability and projection over the long term. Regarding individual grants, the impact was stronger for Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions than for European Research Council grants, suggesting that a researcher’s mobility is affected by political uncertainties. Finally, in the UK case, we observed a steep decrease in the participation of SMEs. Based on these results, we suggest that a stable framework of participation and a clear ruling on relationships with the EU for what concerns people’s mobility and economic relationships are key to fostering the participation of third-party countries.

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“…Moreover, Britain's trade with the rest of the world was also badly affected by the pandemic, with large falls in both the import and export of cars, fuels, works of art and clothing (ONS, 2020). The (potential) negative economic effects of the Brexit on the UK (Brown et al, 2019;Kohnert, 2018) would further aggravate the looming economic recession. According to Andy Haldane, the chief economist of the Bank of England, mass under-and unemployment is the result.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of Brexit on Africa in times of the Corona Crisis - The case of South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya

Kohnert¹

2020

Preprint

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& RÉSUMÉ : Although Britain has been so far the hardest hit among the EU member states by the corona pandemic, Johnson persists to leave the EU at the end of 2020, whatever the cost. Presumably, the pandemic will have a by far bigger impact on the UK African trade than a no-deal Brexit. In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa had been arguably the hardest hit country both by Brexit and Corona. However, the poor, mainly working in the informal sector, were more concerned about the economic impact of the pandemic than the disease itself. In Nigeria, many people envisaged Corona as a plague of the rich and the elite. President Buhari shared the hubris of many British that they are less vulnerable to the pandemic and could continue with high-flying Post-Brexit plans. Ghana counts among those countries in Sub-Sahara Africa which has been most severely hit by the corona pandemic. But unlike South Africa and Nigeria, the direct effects of the pandemic on the downturn of its economy are not as significant as in other African states. In Kenya the number of corona-death had been much lower than for the SARS pandemic of 2003, but the transmission of the COVID-19 virus had been significantly greater. Nevertheless, many Kenyan’s saw the Brexit as a disguised blessing because they pined their hope on massive FDI by UK investors. In any case, it is clear beyond doubt that those who are to suffer most by the combined effects of the corona-pandemic and Brexit in Africa (and presumably world-wide) are the poor and vulnerable. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ : Bien que la Grande-Bretagne ait jusqu'à présent été la plus durement touchée par la pandémie corona parmi les États membres de l'UE, Johnson persiste à quitter l'UE fin 2020, quel qu'en soit le coût. Vraisemblablement, la pandémie aura un impact beaucoup plus important sur le commerce africain du Royaume-Uni qu'un Brexit sans accord. En Afrique subsaharienne, l'Afrique du Sud a probablement été le pays le plus durement touché par le Brexit et Corona. Cependant, les pauvres, travaillant principalement dans le secteur informel, étaient plus préoccupés par l'impact économique de la pandémie que par la maladie elle-même. Au Nigéria, beaucoup de gens considéraient Corona comme un fléau pour les riches et l'élite. Le président Buhari a partagé l'orgueil de nombreux Britanniques selon lesquels ils sont moins vulnérables à la pandémie et pourraient continuer avec des plans de haut vol après le Brexit. Le Ghana compte parmi les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne qui ont été les plus durement touchés par la pandémie de corona. Mais contrairement à l'Afrique du Sud et au Nigéria, les effets directs de la pandémie sur le ralentissement de son économie ne sont pas aussi importants que dans d'autres États africains. Au Kenya, le nombre de décès par effet corona a été beaucoup plus faible que pour la pandémie de SRAS de 2003, mais la transmission du virus COVID-19 a été nettement plus importante. Néanmoins, de nombreux Kenyans ont vu le Brexit comme une bénédiction déguisée car ils portaient leur espoir sur le IDE massif des investisseurs britanniques. En tout état de cause, il est clair, sans aucun doute, que ceux qui souffriront le plus des effets combinés de la pandémie corona et du Brexit en Afrique (et vraisemblablement dans le monde entier) sont les pauvres et les vulnérables.

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The (potential) impact of Brexit on UK SMEs: regional evidence and public policy implications

Cited by 44 publications

References 28 publications

Shocks, uncertainty and regional resilience: The case of Brexit and Scottish SMEs

Shocks, uncertainty and regional resilience: The case of Brexit and Scottish SMEs

Institutional barriers to participation in EU framework programs: contrasting the Swiss and UK cases

The impact of Brexit on Africa in times of the Corona Crisis - The case of South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya

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