The populist challenge to European defense

Rebordering Europe: external boundaries and integration in the European Union

“…At the level of citizens, Lutz and Karstens (2021) find that the migration shock of 2015 strengthened preferences for external rebordering without undermining support for internal debordering, thus generating public support for effective integration. Whereas populist parties generally share an anti-immigration agenda, Henke and Maher (2021) do not find a consistent and distinctive pattern for their positions on European defence integration. Bélanger and Schimmelfennig (2021) observe a marked slowdown of the enlargement and association process after 2007.…”

“…The contributions to this collection do not represent a selection of comparative cases designed to test the analytical framework, but explore a variety of EU bordering issues, actors and processes at different levels: the migration (Kriesi et al, 2021) and Corona pandemic crises (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2021), the preferences of EU citizens in response to the migration crisis (Lutz & Karstens, 2021) and of populist parties on EU defence policy (Henke & Maher 2021), parliamentary discourses on enlargement (Bélanger & Schimmelfennig, 2021), EU regulatory agencies (Lavenex et al, 2021), and EU collective action on defence, migration and the neighbourhood policy (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2021).…”

Populism and foreign policy: a research agenda (Introduction)

“…Recent analyses have started addressing the impact of populism on specific issues, from their skepticism of international courts and multilateralism (Voeten 2020 , 2021 ) to their approach to international cooperation in the COVID-19 pandemic (Bobba and Hubé 2021 ). Henke and Maher ( 2021 ) have compared the positions of European populist parties on defence policy. Moreover, as emphasised above, some studies have provided valuable empirical insights on the foreign policy preferences of populist actors, but theoretically systematic, methodologically comparative and conceptually pluralistic investigations of the influences of populism on foreign policy are still lacking.…”

“…Third, most of the scholarship on the foreign policy of governing populists has focussed on Latin America (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019 ; Wehner and Thies 2020 ; Wajner 2021 ), India (Plagemann and Destradi 2019 ; Wojczewski 2019a ), Turkey (Taş 2020 ) and, especially, the US (Drezner 2019 ; Wojczewski 2019b ; Hall 2021 ). Recent work on Europe has shed light on the foreign preferences of European populist parties (Liang 2007 ; Balfour et al 2016 ; Heinisch et al 2018 ; Coticchia and Vignoli 2020 ; Henke and Maher 2021 ) and how they have been projected at the EU level (Van Berlo and Natorski 2019 ; Futák‐Campbell and Schwieter 2020 ; Falkner and Plattner 2020 ) as well as on populist parties’ sovereignism more generally (see Basile and Mazzoleni 2020 ). By contrast, there has been little extensive analysis of the national foreign policies of European populist governments and how they have brought about changes of directions across policy areas (or not).…”

The Domestic Challenge to EU Foreign Policy-Making: From Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation?

“…Though the capacity of populist parties to influence foreign policy is not limited to situations where they are in power, populists in government certainly have the greatest ability to shape the direction of foreign policy. Simultaneously, populist parties -and particularly their right-wing brand -have acquired a reputation for their ideological scepticism of core EU foreign policy norms and values (see Dyduch and Müller this SI) as well as for departing from important established foreign policy positions of their countries (Henke and Maher 2021). This not only turns populists in government into potential agents of de-Europeanisation, but it may also bring them into the focus of other international actors that seek to influence, or even undermine, a common EU foreign policy from the outside.…”