The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance

Quaglia, Lucia

doi:10.1111/gove.12344

Cited by 18 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(60 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Post‐crisis, we find greater domestic oversight of the rules that financial regulators have agreed upon at the international level. Similarly to other international soft law standards, such as the Basel Accords (Quaglia ), in the LAC case, regulators were confronted with pressure from elected officials and domestic banks to implement national rules that were different from those agreed upon internationally.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulators and the quest for coherence in finance: The case of loss absorbing capacity for banks

Quaglia

Spendzharova

2018

Public Administration

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

After the international financial crisis, new financial regulation was adopted at the international, regional and national levels, raising the issue of how to promote regulatory coherence, defined as the consistency between the rules adopted at different governance levels and in a variety of policy venues. A major recent area of reform concerned the loss absorbing capacity (LAC) of banks. In practice, the lack of regulatory coherence concerning LAC hampers the effective resolution of large international banks in a timely manner, ultimately undermining financial stability. We examine the role of regulators in the quest for coherence on LAC, explaining the incentives they had and how they deployed their delegated competences at different levels to achieve coherent rules that ensure financial stability. Theoretically, we combine insights from the public administration and political economy literatures. Methodologically, we process trace the making of LAC rules on three governance levels and in multiple policy venues.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulators and the quest for coherence in finance: The case of loss absorbing capacity for banks

Quaglia

Spendzharova

2018

Public Administration

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Drawing on the rich empirical material from our case studies, we develop an analytical framework which sets out the political economy conditions under 8 On Basel I implementation by Basel Committee members see (Chey, 2014;Quillin, 2008). On the failure of the US and EU to implement Basel II and III, respectively, see (Quaglia, 2019). which we expect to see trajectories of convergence, divergence, or subversion in countries on the financial periphery.…”

Section: Our Argument In a Nutshellmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…There is a vast, and growing, literature on the politics of financial regulation within and among countries in the core of the global financial system (see for instance Botzem, 2014;Büthe and Mattli, 2011;Haber and Calomiris, 2015;Helleiner, 2014;Kapstein, 1989;Lall, 2012;Lavelle, 2013;Oatley and Nabors, 1998;Perry and Nölke, 2006;Porter, 2005;Quaglia, 2019Quaglia, , 2014Singer, 2007;Tarullo, 2008;Underhill and Zhang, 2008;Young, 2012;Zysman, 1984). Scholarship on the politics of financial regulation in emerging economies and developing countries is equally insightful yet much less extensive and has tended to focus on the largest emerging and developing countries (Chey, 2014;Haggard and Lee, 1995;HamiltonHart, 2002;Hutchcroft, 1998;Knaack, 2017;Lavelle, 2004;Martinez Diaz, 2009;Naqvi, 2019;Walter, 2008).…”

Section: Contribution To Scholarshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Puzzle

Jones¹

2020

The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter sets out the puzzle at the heart of this book: why do governments in many developing countries choose to regulate their banks on the basis of international standards they did not design, and which are costly to implement? Country case studies across Africa, Asia, and Latin America provide compelling evidence of the reputational, competitive, and functional incentives generated by financial globalization that lead regulators to adopt international standards. The chapter summarizes the book’s core argument about the channels of regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and periphery of the global financial system, and the conditions under which we find that regulators to converge on, or diverge from, international banking standards.

show abstract

“…The interpretation process involves domestic actors making sense of the international standards by finding answers to two interlinked questions: (A) Is adopting 21 Farrell and Newman (2014;; Newman and Posner (2018); Young (2014); Xi (2016). 22 Putnam (1988); see also Quaglia (2019); Quaglia and Spendzharova (2017). 23 Mosley (2010), 732.…”

Section: Domestic Policy Process and The Politics Of Compliancementioning

confidence: 98%

Compliance Forces, Domestic Policy Process, and International Regulatory Standards: Compliance with Basel III

Çoban

2019

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article contributes to our understanding of how and why developing countries would comply with international banking regulatory standards, Basel standards. The article demonstrates the interplay between opportunity structures constituted by transnationalization of public policymaking and domestic institutional setting, and how forces of compliance resonate in the domestic politics of compliance. The empirical findings are based on Turkey's compliance with Basel standards. It relies on fieldwork that involves semi-structured qualitative interviews with senior regulators and bankers, which are complemented with analysis of secondary data. The article shows that a capable and willing regulator could capitalize on the top-down policymaking style which restricts the regulatee's access to international negotiations, and sets the terms at the domestic level. Direct access to international negotiations, resource asymmetry in favor of the regulator, and superior "negotiation knowledge" helped the regulator pacify a critical, sceptical regulatee, and drive the compliance process. The article also shows that the compliance process takes place at three stages: policy formulation at the international level, an "interpretation stage" in between the international and the domestic levels, and finally the domestic policy process.

show abstract

The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance

Cited by 18 publications

References 31 publications

Regulators and the quest for coherence in finance: The case of loss absorbing capacity for banks

Regulators and the quest for coherence in finance: The case of loss absorbing capacity for banks

The Puzzle

Compliance Forces, Domestic Policy Process, and International Regulatory Standards: Compliance with Basel III

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About